



Daily Report

East Europe

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Albania: PD 'Discontent' Toward Berisha Viewed

AU3107113496 Tirana POLI I QENDRES
in Albanian 31 Jul 96 p 3

[Commentary by P. Nesturi: "Tension in the Democratic Party—No to the Breach With the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the Democratic Party [PD] possesses 122 parliamentary seats, which makes it the ruling party, discontent is taking firm root in the party ranks. Spreading from the party's lower echelons, the wave has risen and engulfed even a section of its leadership, which now thinks that the time has come to raise its voice and even to put forward alternatives beyond the plans outlined by Number One. The new political circumstances, the isolation of the PD and its government since the 26 May elections, and the criticisms of the international community are leading to the logical conclusion that the axiom so far of "With Berisha in Victory or Defeat" is becoming out of date.

Berisha's totalitarianism and his iron grip on his party had earlier led to dissatisfaction and winds of change that mainly aimed at minimizing the president's control over the PD. However, these initiatives started off with unsure steps and failed, collapsing in front of Berisha's determination and his influence over the party. Selami's removal from the party chairmanship made the other leaders lie low and accept the word of the victor as that of Almighty God. Berisha took care from then on to man his staff not with rivals but with toadies whom he has been able to divide into rival camps or clans against one other. This idea, previously used by Mao Zedong, was to set everybody at one another's throats in the name of the leader, and at first yielded results. Later, it only increased the compactness of these groups in defending themselves not against their rivals but against the head of state himself. As heads began to roll, the perverse satisfaction of the victims' rivals for the leader's attention gave way to an awareness that their own turn would come next.

Thus, when the time came for the election campaign of 26 May, Berisha's position within the PD was not to be envied. His statements that he would resign as president if he lost the election were even applauded as offering hope that Berisha might descend from the throne.

The farce of 26 May showed that the head of state had thought out everything in detail: the violence, the rigging, and even the election results, which were forecast by the "opinion polls" of phantom foundations. However, Berisha had not forecast the immediate reaction of the public and of international institutions. Despite his excursions abroad, he did not succeed in softening their critical stand toward the abuses. In his annoyance,

he called the resolutions of the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE and the attitudes of the U.S. State Department "infringements of Albanian sovereignty." However, his failure to reflect let to the critical tones becoming harsher. No congratulations arrived on the "PD victory," no good wishes for the Meksi government, and the parliamentary chamber was boycotted by the U.S. diplomats in Tirana.

Recent political developments, especially the statements by Perina and the views of the United States expressed through Nicholas Burns, have led to reflection and an adjustment of positions within the PD leadership. Setting aside their rivalries among themselves and not wishing to become kamikaze pilots, they feel that Berisha is steering the PD ship toward dangerous reefs on which it could be wrecked. The idea of not exacerbating relations with the United States is increasingly crystallizing within the PD camp. With his policies, Berisha is heading for new isolation. The suspension of aid from the United States and Europe would lead to serious consequences not only for the country but for the PD. Discontent has taken root and the silence so far cannot cover up the crack that has appeared. Meanwhile, the only people with the right or the courage to speak out on foreign relations are Berisha and Shehu.

The other leaders are watching in silence the battle in the Socialist Party camp. Perhaps they are planning how the same process might take place in the PD too.

Albania: Commentary on Reform Debate Within Socialist Party

AU2907193996 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian
28 Jul 96 pp 4-5

[Commentary by Blendi Fevziu: "Presidium Holds Fatos Nano Hostage"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Socialist Party [PS] and its internal developments have held Albanian politics hostage for more than a month now. The now overt contest between Chairman Nano and the party's four deputy chairmen is being played on an open field, and chairmen and leaders of other parties are often and without much tact being drawn in. It is natural to believe that the further course of events will be most important for political developments in the country. The PS, as the largest opposition party, has always dominated the policies of the other smaller opposition parties. Beaten back by the blows of Berisha and without a reliable electorate, they have seen the ranks of PS militants as their only hope, or at least have considered a coalition with them to be the only way of gaining power. The breach of unity in the PS has created a kind of confusion

in the entire political opposition. A direct agreement between the PD [Democratic Party] and the PS could exclude from the stage many other smaller parties, or at least force certain moves on them. Most of them have not been involved in the PS's internal debate on renewal, but have left their strategy to be decided after 26 August [PS congress].

Why Is Nano Asking for Changes in the Party?

The question of renewal and relations within the PS have produced a lot of pompous words in the press during the last few days, and opinions on these issues have occupied the front pages. Even Nano's motion has somehow been derailed, and there is a paradoxical situation in which PS leaders at their meetings and in the newspapers shout about and swear by reform. They are all reaching out for reform, and at the same time attacking their opponents as being against reform. Reform has thus been turned into a kind of joke because everybody favors it, nobody is against it, but there are still two or more camps. [passage omitted]

The victory of the PD and the shift of the political battle into the international arena caught the PS napping. It became clear that, as at other historic moments, foreign institutions would decide Albania's destiny. The PS was at a loss in this situation. Built as a structure to confront Berisha and relying on old militants, it was not prepared to appear before the world with a social-democratic, left-wing vision. The fact is that in this situation the Albanian opposition had only one door open to it, in the shape of Gjinushi's strong ties with the Socialist International.

The blows the PD suffered over the elections and the deterioration of relations with the United States persuaded Nano that this was the best time to show that the PS is a party of young and capable people. Nano thought that replacing the current deputy chairmen with presentable people with clean pasts would be the best chance of continuing his foreign offensive and strengthening one of the PS's very significant weak points. [passage omitted]

As regards reform, it is now clear that Nano has put forward his ideas. The other camp saw fit to say that it accepted the reform, and has now set about carrying it out according to its own vision. This camp has never come out explicitly against Nano's motion, and it will sing the same tune until the congress. Renewal will be the leitmotiv at the congress, too. There will be speeches about it, and hymns will be sung in its honor, but votes will decide whether it is carried out. The votes will belong to people carefully chosen by people in charge of the party organizations. Nano will have a hard battle. Believing in a swift victory, he played the card of Ruci's

resignation and now remains without control over the structures of the party.

The deputy chairmen will not come out openly against Nano. Nano will be elected chairman, and the hall will call on his name and raise photographs of the imprisoned leader. They will all shout about renewal and call it an accomplished fact. But Nano's men will be removed from senior posts, and Nano will find it increasingly difficult to control the party. The deputy chairmen will make decisions and will publish them under the name of the imprisoned leader. Thus the presidium will hold Nano hostage.

Albania: Opposition Parties Set Conditions for Local Elections

AU3007145796

[FBIS Report] Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian on 30 July carries on page three an 800-word statement issued after a discussion among representatives of nine opposition parties in Tirana on 29 July, under the headline "Here Are the Opposition's Demands." Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian on 30 July carries the same statement on pages one and three, under the headline "Nine Political Parties Decide: 'No Elections Without the Necessary Guarantees.'"

The statement, signed by representatives of the Socialist Party, the Social-Democratic Party, the Democratic Alliance, the Democratic Party of the Right, the Agrarian Party, the National Unity Party, the Ecology Party, the Right-Wing Republican Party, and the Popular Party, reads:

"The Albanian political parties, participants in the 26 May parliamentary elections, met together at a roundtable today and responsibly considered the political situation in Albania and the solutions proposed by the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the U.S. State Department. Considering the principles of Western democracy to be the basis for the construction of the new Albanian state and European and Atlantic integration to be the basic guideline of foreign policy, the parties concluded that the application of these proposals must constitute the basis for the solution of the political crisis in Albania according to the compromise decisions achieved at Strasbourg. To this end:

"1. Dialogue between the government and the opposition must start at once with the formation of a party discussion table for all interested parties. The procrastination over this issue so far has been intentional, in order to avoid such discussions.

"The president's decision on the election date, before this dialogue has begun, is a further example of his

policy of 'faits accomplis' and is an obstacle to the start of interparty talks.

"2. The conduct of free and secret elections under the monitoring of the Council of Europe, at a suitable time and as soon as possible, will be the main concern of the roundtable of the parties who participated in the 26 May elections.

"3. The parties, in cooperation with the legislative structures, must commit themselves to creating a legal and democratic framework concentrating mainly on the independence of the courts, civilian control of the police and the secret service, the independence of the public electronic media, and the neutrality of the president and of the civil service and the Army, as conditions to guarantee political activities before the election, to conduct the elections normally, and to enforce their results.

"4. Local elections must be organized according to European standards. This requires the improvement of the Electoral Law in order to guarantee the equal participation of the government and opposition parties in the electoral process and the administration of votes; legal guarantees for the noninterference of the police and the National Intelligence Service in the electoral process; the condemnation of the acts of violence before, during, and after the 26 May elections as a measure to prevent their repetition; equal access of the political parties to the television; the elimination of the president's involvement on the side of the Democratic Party and his confinement to the position given to him by the constitutional laws; the involvement of the Council of Europe in order to guarantee the close supervision of the elections; and a review of the Genocide Law.

"5. The constitution must be drafted by a constitutional assembly elected by a universal ballot according to

a purely proportional law and as soon as possible. These elections must be carried out on the same day as the local elections, in order to guarantee international monitoring.

"The parties stress that only the realization of these demands as a whole can lay the foundation for the consensus among the parties for free and secret political elections in Albania, and that only after reaching this consensus on the basis of Council of Europe Resolution No. 1095 can the application of individual points begin. They reemphasize that the fulfillment of these demands is necessary for the normal conduct of local elections. As a result, the parties will decide whether or not to take part in these elections, depending on the discussion and fulfillment of these demands."

Albania: Arbnori Invites Monitors To Oversee 20 Oct Elections

*AU3107064696 Tirana ATA in English
1337 GMT 30 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TIRANA, JULY 30 (ATA)—Albanian parliamentary Speaker Pjeter Arbnori has invited European and international institutions as well as parliaments of many democratic countries to oversee monitoring the local elections on October 20, 1996, the Press and Information Office of the parliament said.

In a letter to the head of the Council of Europe's Assembly Leni Fischer, Arbnori asked her for the Council's Parliamentary Assembly cooperate with the Central Election Commission in coordinating election monitoring in Albania.

Arbnori also invited the European Parliament, OSCE parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe's Congress for local government to oversee monitoring the elections.

Czech Republic: Social Democrat Head on Backing Government*LD2607143896 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 26 Jul 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Chamber of Deputies yesterday expressed confidence in the new government of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. That represented the final stage in the democratic state-building process in our country in this electoral term. Czech radio's parliamentary correspondent Vladimir Hruby talks to the Speaker of the chamber about the debate in the new legislative assembly and about disappointed Social Democratic voters:

[Begin recording] [Hruby] Thursday's vote of confidence in the Government was preceded by a wide-ranging debate about its policy statement. Mr. Speaker, how satisfied are you with the standard of the debate?

[Zeman] The debate was distinctly controversial. The Social Democrats stressed the fact that the government's policy statement have three basic components: one with which we agree but which often appeared in the last government policy statement and was not fulfilled; a second with which we do not agree and which we shall try to put right by means of the laws we will be submitting; and a third which just is not there, although it should be. That being so, the speeches by some government deputies, particularly ODS [Civic Democratic Party] deputies, suggest something quite different, namely that the government policy statement is absolutely ingenious. I do not believe in ingenious policy statements and I think that everyone blows their own trumpet, but a little more critical self-reflection following a certain lack of success in the elections would not do the ODS any harm.

[Hruby] In the final voting the Social Democrats, by their total absence, conveyed the message that they intend to tolerate this government and thus to put disputed issues on hold until individual laws are debated. Judging by the reaction of many listeners and CSSD voters, the radicals among them—who cannot be ignored—are disappointed and allege that the party has betrayed cheated them. Were you expecting to lose a significant number of supporters—by that I mean a significant number of radical supporters—thus boosting the position of the Communists and the Republicans?

[Zeman] We promised our voters very clearly before the elections, and not just afterward, first that we would never enter into a so-called grand coalition with the ODS, and second, that we would never enter a coalition with the Communists and Republicans. We have kept that promise. Let those voters, whom you describe as disappointed, ask themselves a simple question: Do they

really want the Social Democrats, who are the oldest Czech political party and a democratic one, to go into a coalition with the Communist Party and the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia? I think that is a clear question which has a clear answer: the Social Democrats will do everything in order to keep the minority government under tight and consistent control. We will never betray our electoral platform, nor therefore our voters. That will be seen during the discussions about individual laws. We are not going to replace one extreme with another. We do not support this government and we have said so clearly. We tolerate it as the lesser of two evils. [end recording]

Czech Republic: Activity of Foreign Mafias Detailed*96CH0136B Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 1 Jul 96 pp 1-2*

[Article by Jan Hrbacek: "Russian Mafias Have No Opponents in This Country"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian mafias in our country have competition that cannot essentially threaten their standing. Apart from organized crime gangs of Russian origin, we also have Kosovo-Albanian, Bulgarian, East Asian, Nigerian, as well as Arabic mafia groups in our country. During the course of last year, information indicates that the activities of the Italian Mafia, which is characterized by greater cooperation with our citizens in contrast with the aforementioned gangs, were also monitored.

The most important criminal groups are recruited primarily in Russia, in the Transcaucasus region, and in Ukraine. They are considered by police experts to be most important not only with regard to the toughness that accompanies their activities, but also because of perfectly developed methods for financial fraud and for penetration into organs of state administration, into entrepreneurial circles, and into financial structures. They are headed predominantly by former specialists of the intelligence services who have considerable capital at their disposal. In the Czech Republic, these mafias put into practice profit procedures already tested in Russia, such as the sale of corporate properties, the purchase of real estate, the acquisition of deposits by offering high interests and subsequent bankruptcies, the purchase of uncollectible claims abroad, and so forth. Criminal structures operate in the area of racketeering, smuggling, and so forth. The activities of the most important Ukrainian organization and the advent of its partner, the Solnchevskaya organization, were somewhat paralyzed last year by the police action that took place at the restaurant U Holubu. A similar method was used to restrict even the activities of the Rostov group, the extent

of which was, however, at a lower level than that of the Ukrainian organization. Even Moscow-based mafias—Tagansk, Podolsk, Mazursk—and other groups of Russians, Dagestanis, Armenians, Georgians, and Chechens continue their efforts to prevail in our country. They deal primarily with blackmail and organized prostitution.

The Kosovo-Albanian groups are active primarily in Moravia, and their most frequent activities include racketeering, prostitution, illegal migrations, vehicle theft, distribution of drugs, and so forth. Together with the Bulgarians, they then direct and finance trade involving stolen vehicles.

The Italian branches conduct business with explosives, stolen vehicles, and "manage" even the area of insurance

fraud. Similar principles are employed by the Nigerian mafia, which was not too well known until recently, and the Arabic mafia, whose priorities are primarily drugs. A somewhat different method is employed by East Asian gangs, the overwhelming majority of whom are focused on cases in their own countries. The so-called Viet Ching, ethnic Chinese originating in Vietnam, who speak both languages, are "notorious" for their toughness. Cooperation involving citizens of the Czech Republic is limited purely to the area of legal assistance, interpreting, and handling residency permits.

Slovakia: Coalition Stance on NATO, EU Criticized
 AU3007141296 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
 in Slovak 30 Jul 96 p 9

[Commentary by Julius Gembicky: "Slovakia Is Rather Characterized by Disintegration Tendencies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If the same thing happened to the Czechs, the Poles, or the Hungarians in the House of Representatives and the Senate of the U.S. Congress as recently happened to Slovaks [reference to the exclusion of Slovakia from U.S. NATO integration assistance], they surely would not have dismissed it with a wave of the hand. In Slovakia, however, especially among supporters of the government coalition, it is far more common to lament loudly about the consequences of the Slovak Republic's possible integration into NATO and the EU than to emphasize our vital interest in this historic chance of integration.

In formulating its geopolitical interests, Slovakia is much more responsive and sensitive to the needs and ideas of Russia than to the comments contained in the demarches and resolutions of Western democracies. Despite the fact that, in the event of its elimination from the first round of admitting candidates for NATO and EU membership, Slovakia will be in store for the isolationist curtailment of its exports to EU countries, the destination of 49 percent of Slovak exports in 1995, will be deprived of the benefits of the customs union with the Czech Republic, and will face a reduction of the trade volume with Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) countries, from the foreign policy but also domestic policy viewpoints, Slovakia is characterized rather by disintegration tendencies. Unfortunately, only a part of the Slovak intelligentsia, whom the brakemen of integration have labeled as cosmopolitans, realizes that the retrospective view is taking precedence over the vision of the future for the young and middle generations.

Even after German Chancellor Helmut Kohl "eliminated" our country from the first round of Europe's federalization and after the vote in the U.S. Congress, there is pontifical peace in Slovakia. It is as if participation in the satellite tournaments of European security and cooperation suited this country fine.

In this situation which is qualitatively different from the one in which Slovakia found itself until recently, the coalition Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] and the Slovak National Party [SNS] no longer have to frighten the peace-loving population of the small Slovak Republic with "vassalage" as a consequences of NATO entry and with the hypochondria of the deployment of nuclear weapons on Slovak territory.

Apparently, Slovakia will not have to share the tough postintegration ordeal of neighboring Austria after its EU entry and, what is more, it will save the costs of the two referendums that would precede the Slovak Republic's entry into NATO and the EU.

It can be said with a certain sarcasm that the Slovak Republic has not yielded to the lure of integration. Quite the contrary, by setting preliminary conditions (boundless patience and understanding for the specific problems of an emerging democracy, which are no different from those in other postcommunist countries, and primarily sensitivity to the government's idea of majority parliamentary democracy, personally conveyed by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar to the most important European and world politicians and statesmen), it has managed to defend the status of a neutrality that is not guaranteed by anyone.

Slovakia: International 'Double Standard' Denounced

AU3007125696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA
 in Slovak 30 Jul 96 p 1

[Commentary by Peter Janosik in the "Public Matter" editorial column]

[FBIS Translated Text] How would German Chancellor Helmut Kohl have reacted if a Slovak politician had put forward the view that "there are too many Germans?" Maybe, he would have tried to wipe Slovakia from the political map of Europe. The leader of the Czech republicans, Miroslav Sladek, has such a view of the Germans and he makes no secret of this in public. According to Czech political representatives, this is akin to the former Protectorate slogan: A dead German is a good German.

It is not known whether a demarche will arrive in Prague from Bonn in connection with Sladek's statement or whether this remark will disappear in the turmoil of interest surrounding the formation of the new Czech government. By the way, almost one in ten Czech parliament deputies is subordinate to Sladek and together they certainly represent a notable balance on the scales. No one in Bonn, however, is, obviously, alarmed that support for Sladek's party has increased substantially since the last parliamentary elections. The Czech Republic still remains for Germany a state undergoing normal democratic development that should not cause any problems for an expanded European Union or North Atlantic Alliance.

If a Slovak politician were to say that there are too many Hungarians or that they are disproportionately vociferous, there would be no end of demarches. In

Slovakia, however, we do not cultivate spreading fear of other nations or whip up hatred of them. This is our basic prerequisite or "asset" for admission into the European structures. The Sladekites do not refrain from whipping up hatred.

Who else in Europe is spreading fear of other nations? Is it not, for example, the foreign Hungarians? After all, how else can the recent "Hungary and Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders" conference be described, a conference at which the foreshadowing of the spread of Hungarian influence among other nations was unequivocal?

But in Europe and the world a double standard is still applied in assessing individual countries. Such stances do not serve domestic political development in the given states, regardless of the fact that they are often not even well respected. Not pragmatism, but ossified conservatism is applied in considering the new specific features in European countries. Even it, however, is not a panacea for everything.

Slovakia: MKDH Official on Euro-Atlantic Integration Talks

AU3007152096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 30 Jul 96
p 4

[Article by Pal Csaky, Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, MKDH, deputy chairman in charge of foreign policy: "Peculiar Lobbying"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lobbying is an art. The lobbying party actually creates a double relationship; on the one hand, it manifests its wishes, but at the same time it presents a clear picture of itself to the partner. In this beautiful vacation time, I read that some Slovak nongovernmental parties have agreed to coordinate their steps regarding joint lobbying in the matter of the admission of the Slovak Republic into the Euroatlantic structures. I must admit that I do not altogether understand this resolution. I believe that such a declaration does not have real content. It is aimed only at the public, and its goal is to protect the relevant political entities from attacks of the government coalition following its foreign policy failures. Such empty statements seem to me unfair to the citizens of this state. Whoever wants to gain recognition from the European public must have a clear opinion on the matters in question and know the correlations to be taken seriously. The Slovak Republic is not accepted by the EU and NATO because the present government team violated the common rules of democracy in several clear-cut instances. An important moment in judging Slovakia is also the fact that the present government coalition consists of Euro-noncoformist parties and, based on certain spe-

cific steps, this government is considered unpredictable. In this context, the statements of some Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] deputies that a certain correction may take place in September in the approach of the HZDS to certain specific issues are not convincing. These endeavors are not sufficient; it is necessary to remove all the deformations and it is necessary to respect all rules of democracy. We are not going to dictate these rules to the democratic world, but vice versa: We must adjust to the tested models. So we want to point out to the occasional group of nongovernment parties that the problem of Slovak incompatibility is not a shortage of lobbying, but rather the serious deformations in Slovak politics. If someone does not realize this, he can even harm himself by impulsive steps. Let the esteemed SME readers themselves decide on the reaction to the following appeal: I, X, am from Slovakia, and I love my country. Therefore, I implore the esteemed United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, NATO, and the EU to have all your decisions approved by the Slovak Government before they go into effect. Although this government coalition in Slovakia does not cooperate with us, the trade unions, and other civic groupings much, it may be better with you.... No, I am not exaggerating. The EU and NATO operate on the principle of consensus, i.e., every country has in fact the right of veto. Moreover, every country is represented in these organizations by its respective government. I am not aware of any country that was pushed into the North Atlantic structures despite the intentions of its government. Words do not mean much here, deeds decide. In the name of the Hungarian coalition, I propose, in all seriousness, the following: We have an eminent interest in the integration of the Slovak Republic into the Euroatlantic structures and offer our help to realize this process. The first step must be, however, talks between us and the government coalition, and we must get a promise of the observance at least three conditions:

- a) in domestic policy, we will return to the mechanisms applied until November 1994;
- b) in the sphere of foreign policy, no official will question the Euroatlantic orientation of the Slovak Republic, and no one will mention such irresponsible alternatives as neutrality, Eastern, or Balkans orientation;
- c) written records will be kept of all agreements, and the agreed upon measures will be implemented.

At the same time, we propose a political roundtable of all parliamentary parties to discuss the reasons for the present situation and to coordinate future steps.

Slovakia: Hungarian Compromise on Autonomy Called 'Vacuous'*AU3007145696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 30 Jul 96 p 5*

[Article by Monika Volekova: "A Vacuous Hungarian-Hungarian Compromise"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The meeting between the Hungarian and Slovak parliamentary Foreign Committees, which was held at the invitation of our side in Bratislava last week, has shown that a pragmatic course of action in the spirit of the saying "the end justifies the means" is not always appropriate. During the several hours of talks, the Hungarian delegation did not define the autonomy contained in the joint statement issued by the Hungary and Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders conference in Budapest. It follows on from this that Prime Minister Gyula Horn's government has promised foreign Hungarians support for something that it itself is unable to explain and, subsequently, to justify to Slovakia and Romania, the countries this concerns most. Support for an indefinable autonomy (from what the Hungarian politicians in our country have said, we are aware of educational, personal, cultural, and, most recently, also intellectual autonomy) is and will be very hard, especially as both we and the Romanians insist on individual rights, and not on collective rights. At the same time, the situation in every European country is specific and international norms for introducing autonomy for minorities are not required.

The Hungarian-Hungarian compromise or, rather, deal celebrated by the press, autonomy in return for the assistance of the foreign Hungarians in the mother country's entry into NATO, has turned out to be vacuous and nonfunctional. Horn's government, however, has promised this (to ensure that it does not lag behind its Central European partners) and hopes that the statute of autonomy will, in the end, be dealt with somehow by means of mutual dialogue, while it stays clean in the eyes of its compatriots. The fact that the joint declaration does not contain a timetable for implementing autonomy will also assist this.

The ease with which the Hungarian side, at a press briefing held after the talks, circumvented—through Andras Barsony, a deputy in the Hungarian Foreign Committee—the legal definition of autonomy and gave priority to its contents was downright shocking. Slovakia knows from its own experience in the formulation of the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty how much depends on the fine tuning of every word. In turn, Hungarian policy is aware that any kind of legislative confines for autonomy reduce its room for maneuver and the possibility of prolonging talks ad infinitum until Slovakia

and Romania give in or until the Hungarian minorities back down from their visions or until a power is found that will support the demands for autonomy.

It is to our credit that, following the publication of the joint declaration, we did not "close the door" on Hungary, but opened the way to dialogue. It is necessary to communicate with Hungarian representatives, thus showing that we are interested in transparent Slovak-Hungarian relations and stability in the region, which will send a pertinent signal to the West in the case of NATO enlargement. Hungary's isolation would merely encourage the self-pitying feelings of the "Trianon mourners" and strengthen the position of the Hungarian Coalition parties in our country. Direct communication is the most effective mechanism. The Hungarian deputies demonstrated in the discussion on autonomy that they do not know what they are talking about. The various departures from the subject merely proved this. Even the jovial gestures by Hungarian Foreign Committee Chairman Matyas Eorsi at the press briefing did not conceal the confused impression caused in Bratislava by the Hungarian delegation's views.

Hungarian foreign policy is playing with fire when it flirts publicly with autonomy in the Central European region. Moreover, this is at a time—since the collapse of the communist bloc—when it is not protected. Any destabilization in this region has always been tragically fateful for its inhabitants and history has taught us sufficiently who has always made the most of the division of Central Europe.

Slovakia: Daily's Chief Editor Announces Resignation*AU2907143496 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 27 Jul 96 p 3*

[Reply by Chief Editor Jan Smolec to reader's question; from the "Mr. Chief Editor..." column]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Question] Is it true that you are about to leave the post of SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA chief editor? Won't you feel sorry about abandoning a "child" through which you enriched Slovak journalism? I hope you are not leaving for political or similar reasons. If, God forbid, someone should want to harm you, publish it and we, the readers, will help you! We have helped you in the past. Let me know what the situation is with you.

[Signed] Irena Medvedova, Banska Bystrica

[Smolec] Mrs. Medvedova!

It is true. I am leaving the post of executive chief editor. Your question solved my problem about how

to communicate my decision to the readers. Today's reply to—or more accurately discussion with—readers is actually my last. On Monday [29 July] I will begin my annual leave, and on 1 September the new chief editor will take up the post. I want to help him with advice. My heart will, of course, bleed for the newspaper. I went through exciting moments in the editorial office, victories as well as defeats. The people I criticized, with the president at their head, set the courts upon me. They filed a total of 20 suits against me. My heart will also bleed for the wonderful and encouraging letters and meetings with readers. Had it not been for them, I would have quit a long time ago. I will recall with a smile the dramatic and often desperate and hopeless moments when the "pro-government newspaper" was in the throes of a financial crisis. I am happy that, together with a collective of journalists dedicated to Slovakia, I have succeeded in rearing in a short time a strong opinion-forming newspaper that has struck firm roots on the mass media market. Initially, this was the only newspaper through which we fought for independent Slovakia. Our defense of it was successful. During the last elections, we were the sole opinion-forming daily to support candidates with a pro-Slovak orientation. They won. The readers were more appreciative of our work than the publishers. But our adversaries, too, were able to assess the price of our newspaper, yet we rejected the glitter of foreign coins. They would liquidate us by buying us. We are probably still the poorest editorial office. I did not live to see a computer on my desk.

Running this newspaper has been hard work. But it has also been great joy to register the first successes of the Slovak Republic. I thank you, Mrs. Medvedova, and you, other readers, for your favor.

Slovakia: Personnel Changes in State Media Predicted

AU3007150596 Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak
30 Jul 96 p 2

[Report by "r": "Will the STV Director Step Down Voluntarily?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NOVY CAS managed to learn yesterday that substantial changes in some Slovak

mass media are planned for September. News agencies have already reported the resignation of SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA Chief Editor Jan Smolec. According to our information, his post should be taken up by Jozef Darmo, present director of Slovak Television [STV]. The vacated seat of STV director should go to Viera Urbanova, currently deputy chief editor of SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA. Peter Strelinger, the other deputy chief editor of SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, should become executive chief editor of NARODNA OBRODA. His place in SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA should be filled by I. Grassinger, representative of the Association of Slovak Journalists.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 30 July on page 2 carries a 150-word report by Helena Budinska on Jan Smolec's recent announcement of his departure from the post of SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA executive chief editor. Asked by the NARODNA OBRODA correspondent about Smolec's successor, Deputy Chief Editor Viera Urbanova reportedly replied that members of the editorial staff "really do not know who will be the new chief editor." Budinska points out that Jan Smolec is a parliamentary deputy for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and that "SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA is the only Slovak daily that Prime Minister and HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar openly describes as pro-government."]

Hungary: Civic Groups 'Concerned' About Nuclear Deployment

LD3007202196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1630 GMT 30 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Members of over 40 civic organizations are concerned because they believe that Hungarian politicians have not dissociated themselves from the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons here. As they say in their appeal issued this morning, the deployment of nuclear means in Hungary would be tantamount to our country's becoming a potential target for nuclear attack.

Another remark before a report by Robert Szuecs Palinkas: China conducted its final nuclear test on 29 July. The first person to reply to his questions is Laszlo Perneczky, spokesman for the Alba Circle [peace movement]:

[Begin recording] [Palinkas] Why did you consider it important to demand a nuclear-free Hungary? Hungary has no nuclear weapons.

[Perneczky] There are none at the moment. There is a strong suspicion that there were [nuclear] carriers in Hungary during the time of the Warsaw Treaty. Moreover, Hungary has not dissociated itself in any way, in its endeavors to join NATO, from the stockpiling of nuclear devices, or at least carrier missiles, on Hungarian territory.

The Czech Republic has already declared that it is game for this. Therefore, there is a pressing need for us to try to exert pressure on our government, our parliament, so that they declare immediately that Hungary is not willing under any circumstances, either as a member of a military bloc or as a neutral country, to stockpile nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on its territory.

[Palinkas] Do you not consider it strange that the time of the great peace movements was the early 1980's in western Europe, in the United States, and there were such endeavors in eastern Europe too? These movements existed then, and it appears that they then died out or at least they became silent. These movements seem to have died out. Is it still necessary to take a stand against nuclear weapons?

[Perneczky] It is true that this peace cause is in a trough, but we cannot abandon it. Just as the environmental protection movement is gaining popularity and has more activists, it is conceivable that peace movements

will also be necessary. There are more wars going on throughout the world. The weapons still exist as a threat even if there are signs of detente.

We do not wish to launch a collection of signatures or any campaign of that type because we feel signature-collecting actions—in connection with NATO accession—have lost force. Parliament circumvents them as it wishes.

We simply would like to show the decisionmakers that there are forces in Hungary, and the number of people involved is not so small, who oppose the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in Hungary and who remember the tragedy of Hiroshima. I do not really think this is adequate for exerting political pressure, but if we are able to direct some attention to this event, then it will have been worth it.

[Palinkas] Let us hear Istvan Gyarmati, state secretary at the Defense Ministry. Why did you decide to visit the meeting of the Alba Circle?

[Gyarmati] I think it is very important to hold dialogue even with civil organizations opposed to us. Thus we can genuinely inform the public of all views, in favour or opposed to our NATO membership, for in the end it will be citizens who will decide on Hungary's NATO membership.

[Palinkas] There was objection to the fact that you told the meeting to hold coordination talks instead of continuing the debate in the press. What did you mean?

[Gyarmati] I did not sense any objection, nor did I say what I was quoted as saying. What I told them was to hold consultations instead of exchanging messages via the press. Press reports and questions are very useful. We would like to involve the press in this debate substantially rather than exclude it.

[Palinkas] What do you think of the demand that no nuclear weapons should be stationed in Hungary?

[Gyarmati] Just as one cannot be half pregnant, one cannot be half NATO member either. We want to be NATO members as soon as possible, for that would best guarantee the country's security. The decision that will be made regarding nuclear weapons is another question. Stationing more and more nuclear weapons does not seem to be the current tendency in Europe—just the opposite. NATO's expansion is unlikely to change that. [passage omitted] [end recording]

B-H: Sarajevo Media Fail To Disclose U.S. Request on Iranian Aid

LD3007190996 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1900 GMT 30 Jul 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, July 30 (TANJUG)—Sarajevo media on Tuesday [30 July] did not publish that the United States has demanded the Muslim government to turn down Iranian assistance while the Muslim government has failed to react to the U.S. request.

Observer circles said that the news will be received with surprise given that only a few days earlier the government gave great media coverage to a 50-million dollar memo on economic cooperation signed with Iran.

Under the memorandum, Iran would grant this year 10 million dollars for the development of small business and five million dollars for the reconstruction of infrastructure.

The prime minister of the Sarajevo government, Hasan Muratovic, recently said that Bosnia's foreign and economic policies relied on the United States, the European Union and the Organization of Islamic Countries.

He advocated good relations with Islamic states by saying: "We belong to the Islamic religion and are part of that culture."

B-H: Commentary Examines Influence of U.S-Iran Dispute

AU3007173096 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE
in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jul 96 p 2

[Commentary by Deno Novo: "Walking on Eggs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The so-called lull in the efforts by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran to gain stronger influence and footholds in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not last long. After the spring military action by the IFOR special units had manifested more than amply the U.S. policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina's tightrope walking between the friendly nations of the West and even friendlier nations of the Islamic East, the Bosnians were presented with the dilemma "either, or" which left no room to avoid giving an exact answer.

Iran continued the battle that it lost in this department by other means. The climax of this change was the visit by Dr. Hasan Habibi to Sarajevo, during which the Iranian vice president did not bypass a single more important Bosnia-Herzegovina politician. Instead of the ideological flourish and stories about religious unity and brotherhood, Habibi presented his hosts with

\$15 million by the end of the year and an additional prospective \$35 million in the near future.

It will be very interesting (perhaps it would even be amusing had it not involved us) to watch the U.S. response to the latest Iranian offer. If the Americans have the sovereign right (and the power) to prevent Iran's military presence, even at the cost of banning the import of any sort of arms from the East, then they will find it very difficult to find a plausible objection to Iran's economic involvement in Bosnia.

This time the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities must truly rise to the task and find (an almost impossible) equilibrium between the two opposing political options which originate far from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but clash most fiercely and precisely here. The Bosnians have willy-nilly been forced to walk on the eggs which can in this case prove to be more painful for the walker than for the owners.

B-H: Muratovic Rejects U.S. Demand To Turn Down Iran Aid

AU3107104396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 31 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic said in Geneva today that Bosnia-Herzegovina is not in a position to turn down anyone's sincere help, particularly if no conditions are attached. Muratovic, who is currently attending a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Countries' Contact Group in Geneva, was responding to a statement made yesterday by State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns who said that Bosnia-Herzegovina does not need Iran's aid.

I wish that the disabled people who are protesting in front of Skenderija could answer Mr. Burns, or those waiting for someone to supply windows and doors for the coming winter, or the hundreds of thousands who are waiting for any kind of job, the prime minister said. He stressed that Bosnia-Herzegovina needs everyone's help if it is sincere and has no conditions attached, particularly as the extent of the destruction makes it impossible for Bosnia to solve its problems with the help of only one country.

Today, the greatest obligation of international solidarity is to help the economic reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Prime Minister Muratovic added. Still, the latest statistics show that there is a substantial gap between the amounts of promised and received reconstruction aid. According to Muratovic, only about 10 percent of the promised aid has been realized so far, while the realization of another 25 percent is in progress.

B-H: Muratovic Criticizes IFOR for Failure in Dobrinja Area

AU3007161596 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE
in Serbo-Croatian 30 Jul 96 p 3

[BH PRESS report: "IFOR Indecisive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has sent a letter to U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith, commander of IFOR [Implementation Force], which states the following:

"One of the key parts of the peace agreement refers to the interentity boundary line (IEBL). Due to its importance, this part of the agreement has been defined specifically in the special Annex 2. In line with the agreed pace of implementation of the peace agreement, the transfer of territories between the entities and marking the IEBL was supposed to be completed 90 days after that IFOR assumed authority.

"However, today, even seven months after IFOR has started its mandate, this job has not been done in the Dobrinja area. The boundary line in Dobrinja is still the same as during the war. People are being prevented from returning to their apartments from which they were expelled at the beginning of the war. The Federation bodies are unable to establish control over the territories that belong to it, incidents involving illegal arrests of people are permanent phenomena, and the authorities of the Serb entity are illegally moving people in and usurping apartments. IFOR's mandate has entered the second half and we are afraid that further delays will cause additional problems and represent a very bad precedent in the implementation of the peace agreement.

"With its indecisiveness and lenience, IFOR has indirectly been contributing for some time to this issue, which is still unresolved and being additionally politicized, the way the authorities in the Serb entity want it.

"We have stressed several times, and this is our definite stand, that the interentity boundary line in the areas of Dobrinja I and IV, with minimal technical corrections, remains as stipulated by the peace agreement. We took that issue off the agenda a long time ago and do not want to raise it again.

"Therefore, we demand that you and IFOR immediately start the strict establishment of the original interentity boundary line in Dobrinja I and IV, and to make it possible for these territories to come under the Federation's jurisdiction. This is the only way to calm tensions caused by this problem not being solved and secure a peaceful transfer, as has been done in all other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina," Muratovic's letter to Leighton Smith says.

B-H: Muratovic Blames Croats for Obstructing Dayton Agreement

LD3007192396 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i
Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 30 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Current issues facing Bosnia-Herzegovina are to be discussed at tomorrow's Organization of Islamic Conference meeting in Geneva. Foreign ministers will consider the scope for resolving problems facing our country following the failure of the Bosnian Serbs [as heard] to implement the Dayton Agreement. Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic has said the following:

[Begin Muratovic recording] The meeting of the Islamic countries' contact group, which is to be held in Geneva tomorrow, should consider the political and economic aspects of the implementation of the Dayton agreement. I am sure that standpoints will be adopted which will reflect the political influence of the Islamic countries and which will put pressure on Serbia and Croatia to carry out their obligations as per the peace agreement, especially standpoints relating to the cessation of the functioning of Herzeg-Bosnia, which is now the main generator of all problems in the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

Apart from this, I expect the Islamic countries to give concrete and urgent support to the further economic reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina [end recording].

B-H: Izetbegovic Addresses Protesting War Disabled

AU2607155696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 26 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of the decision by the extraordinary assembly of our country's War Disabled Association, the crisis Headquarters of the Association of War Disabled of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina held the central protest meeting in front of the building of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly in Sarajevo today. Here is a report by Dubravka Franjic:

[Begin recording] [Franjic] Numerous war disabled gathered in front of the assembly building and expressed their demands in 12 items that were read by Amir Kriko, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Association of War Disabled.

[Kriko] To urgently adopt laws that we proposed and that above all refer to basic rights of families of killed fighters and war disabled; to materially secure these groups; to recognize these organizations as only organizations of special social interest for Bosnia-Herzegovina; to urgently cover what the state owes to

our people—pay out personal and family disabled benefits and the financial support that have been delayed for six months. We demand that the paying starts immediately and that regular monthly payments are reached by 1 September. We demand that our projects for professional rehabilitation and employment be accepted and financed so we can work and earn for ourselves and our families. We demand that the Federation administration for the issues of fighters of the defense liberation war is constituted as soon as possible; it will give greater influence toward solving all issues of vital importance for our people. We demand that all contracts on renting and purchasing business space signed since the beginning of the war be annulled [loud cheers and applause] so it would be made possible for our people to use their foreign exchange savings and equally take part in purchasing and renting those. We demand that our people and organizations are given due attention, so we are not people of some seventh or eight category, but equal citizens who honestly and honorably defended their state and their people [words indistinct] and work like normal people which they are.

[Franjic] Federation Prime Minister Izudin Kapetanovic tried to address the people present. However, they demanded to be addressed by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After a certain time, President Alija Izetbegovic arrived at the meeting and addressed the people present:

[Izetbegovic] I have not come to give a speech, nor is this the time for speeches. We should do something. I was not strong, I have...[pauses] This was the government's job, to meet these demands of yours [crowd cheers]. However, we shall meet the demands. [cheers] You fought for this country [crowd cheers]. You should know that the country is in great difficulties. In great difficulties, particularly recently.

[Franjic] Amir Kriko reiterated the demands to President Izetbegovic. Solutions have been found for most of them. However, as regards disabled benefits, President Izetbegovic said the following:

[Izetbegovic] I promise you that you will receive two delayed wages. There is another thing: Let Amir Kriko and four more people you chose come to me on Sunday [28 July] at 1100 to agree about the way the delayed wages will be regulated. This is what I can promise you.

Let me tell you one more thing: I am sorry that you had to [word indistinct] for these things. You should not have come, everything should have been solved. [crowd cheers] Things should not be solved in such a way.

[Franjic] The protest of the war disabled has continued in Skenderija, where they will elect a delegation and put down precisely the demands that they will present to President Izetbegovic. [end recording]

B-H: Soljic Discusses Federation Army, War Crimes

AU3007165096 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jul 96 p 12-13

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Defense Minister Vladimir Soljic by Milan Sutalo; place and date not given: "The Americans Guarantee That They Will Distribute Weapons Fairly"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The adoption of the Defense Law has overcome the standstill in the implementation of the Federation and finally made possible the realization of the U.S. "Equip and Train" program, through which one intends to establish a military balance on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an important element of the long-term stability. Before the Defense Law was adopted, Vladimir Soljic, minister of defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, told us that he, too, belongs to the group of federal minister without authority. At the start of our interview, we asked Minister Soljic what authority he has now been given by the recently adopted Defense Law and what his real powers as the minister of defense of the Federation are?

[Soljic] According to the recently adopted Defense Law, the Ministry of Defense will be organized according to a Western model, and that means that the center of government decisionmaking on military issues will be the Ministry of Defense. So, the General Staff of the Federal Army will be within the Ministry of Defense, and it will subordinated to the minister of defense. So, the powers of the minister of defense will be rather great. As far as my real powers are concerned, I can say that I, myself, as the minister, and my deputy, have slowly been taking over the authority prescribed by the law. True, assuming authority over the Muslim military component is a bit harder going, but I think that we will succeed in this too.

[Sutalo] Why did the Muslim side persistently insist on the command of the Federal Army, in contradiction to the Dayton agreement, being raised above the level of the Federation to the level of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and on preventing military conscripts from choosing whether they will serve their military service in the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] or in the Muslim army?

[Soljic] Well, I think that it is not hard to deduce why the Muslim side insisted on those demands. In

every community, the more numerous nation aspires to a unitary state and one army, because that is a mechanism through which it can achieve domination. The Croat nation, which as not as numerous, advocates precisely the opposite—a decentralized state and an army in which one can install a mechanism of protection so that this army cannot turn against the less numerous nation. So, those were the two starting positions, which were completely different.

In other words, the Muslims thought they could fulfill their goals if they raised the command of the Federal Army, in contradiction to the Dayton agreement, to the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if they blocked military conscripts from choosing in which military component they will serve. We could not accept that, and, in the end, a compromise solution was reached according to which the Croat military component will be under the command of a Croat and the Muslim component will be under the command of a Muslim until the elections. We have also succeeded in winning the possibility for Croat officers and noncommissioned officers to be able to choose in which military component they will serve.

[Sutalo] Many people think that such a compromise solution is against the Dayton agreement and that it is at the expense of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Soljic] Well, whether it is against the Dayton agreement or not, we can discuss that, but this what has been done, has been done with the consent of the entire Croat political leadership, and from what I have mentioned earlier, one can clearly see that the achieved solution is not at all at the expense of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those who claim that the solution is at the expense of the Croats, fail to see that there are two sides. If there were no other side, I would be perfectly capable of formulating a law that would suit the Croat interests perfectly, but the opposite side would also be able to formulate a law to suit their interests. Since there are two sides, any solution reached can only be the result of a compromise. What is important, however, is that the compromise on these issues, I claim with full responsibility, is not at the expense of the Croats.

[Sutalo] Do you think that the Muslim side, having accepted this law, gave up its intention to subordinate the HVO, that is, to integrate it into the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army?

[Soljic] I do not know what they intend to do, but I know what they will not succeed in doing. Nobody will ever succeed in subordinating the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because we are capable of defending ourselves. On the other hand, everybody must understand that the state of Croatia is also our state, and that she will know, will be able, and will have the

right to protect the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina if their basic rights and survival are endangered.

[Sutalo] Mr. Minister, the basic task of the Federal Army should be defense of the territory of the Federation from external aggression. If it is so, who might that external aggressor be? What is the defense doctrine of the Federation?

[Soljic] There is a whole series of paradoxes. There are three armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are no winners and no losers. According to the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in theory, the aggressors can be the armies of the neighboring countries—those of Croatia and the FRY. However, it is hard to believe that the army of "the Serb Republic" would stand against the army of the FRY or that the HVO would make war against the Croatian Army.

I can say that, according to the present military doctrine, Croatia is not treated as a potential aggressor. More specifically, the Federal Army would be defending the territory of the Federation from the army of "the Serb Republic." However, there is one more paradox according to the Dayton agreement: The Federal Army cannot cross to the territory of "the Serb Republic," or vice versa. It is hard to imagine what that will look like in the future.

[Sutalo] When the Defense Law was adopted, the implementation of the "Equip and Train" program began. The public fears that the Muslim army, as the larger army, will get more weapons than the HVO, that the balance between the two armies will be violated, and that, in the near future, that may encourage militant Muslim circles to wage a new war against the Croats. Are those fears justified?

[Soljic] Neither in the past nor in the present have the aspirations of only the nations living here, in this territory, been realized. So, they will not be realized in the future, either. Apart from the nations living here, the great powers also have their interests here, and nothing will be achieved that opposes their interests. Concretely, however, when we are talking about an equal distribution of equipment and weapons, there are some indications of unfair behavior by our partners regarding the first shipment of the weapons. However, we have firm guarantees from the Americans that the weapons will be distributed fairly and that strict care will be taken to maintain the balance of arms—that is, the balance of power—between the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

[Sutalo] What quantity and what kind of weapons will be delivered to the Muslim army and to the HVO?

[Soljic] That has not been agreed precisely yet. We have agreed the principles with the U.S. company MPRI, which has been implementing the program, but which we will be able to change depending upon the needs. At the moment, we will reach the maximum quantities of the weapons limited by the Vienna Treaty, that is, howitzers, heavy artillery, armored vehicles, and helicopters, and the rest will be mostly modern communications systems, more up-to-date guns and machine guns. So, all that will not violate the military balance envisaged by the Vienna Treaty.

[Sutalo] In what way will the Federal Army be trained, according to this program?

[Soljic] According to the training program drawn up by the MPRI company, first the command staff will be educated, then the instructors, and then individual and collective training will start—the training of the troops and units. And that program will last until the troops and units learn to use their weapons and are capable of carrying out the duties of the Federal Army.

[Sutalo] It is known that the HVO is organized according to the system in Western armies, while the Muslim army has followed the organization of the former JNA [Yugoslav Peoples' Army]. Does this program envisage that both armies will be organized according to the same model?

[Soljic] Yes, the purpose of this program is to organize the Federal Army according to one system. According to the program, the skeleton of the Federal Army will be formed of professional units. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has no professional units at all, they are only being formed, and they will, in fact, have to reorganize, while the reorganization of the HVO has been completed.

[Sutalo] Is it possible to create the Federal Army, if the Muslim military and civilian police arrest not only soldiers, but also high-ranking HVO officers, as "members of an enemy army"?

[Soljic] If your allusion refers to the incident near Jablanica, I think that can be treated as a case of detention, not arrest. However, in any case, the detention of high-ranking HVO officers has been the worst provocation so far, and I think that it will reflect negatively, both on the implementation of the program for the creation of a common Federal Army and on the implementation of the whole peace process.

I think that the Muslim side is totally unfair in that regard. That is no secret. They have lists of people who they treat as war criminals. But they are not war criminals. This is just the continuation of the implementation of ethnic cleansing in a cunning way.

In fact, they want to provoke fear among the Croats who live in the enclaves in central Bosnia. It is truly ridiculous that nobody has been accused of the war crimes committed against the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when one knows that the first place attacked in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the Croat village of Ravno, that the Croat territories were the first to be attacked, and that so many crimes were committed against the Croat civilians in the Sava River basin, in the Banja Luka region, and particularly in Central Bosnia.

[Sutalo] Mr. Soljic, in this post-war, in peacetime, one of the greatest problems is employing the demobilized members of the HVO. Is this question being solved systematically, or will those who have defended these territories be left on their own to find jobs themselves?

[Soljic] There are people who easily give promises that are very acceptable to the demobilized defenders. On the other hand, there are people who know a bit about it, who are working on solving that problem, and who must tell the truth, although it is not always pleasant. So, the Croat side is dealing with the problem, it is aware of the reality, and it will do and is doing everything it can to help those who defended these territories to find jobs appropriate to their qualifications. I think we will be far more successful than the other side in this, because the other side has only been making empty promises.

[Sutalo] In many diplomatic, intelligence, and journalistic circles, there are predictions that the conflicts could resume in this country when IFOR leaves Bosnia-Herzegovina. What do you think about this?

[Soljic] It is true that various estimations and information warns of such a possibility. Probably, there are people who have already made plans and who will try to revive the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, I think that the leaderships of all three nations will not try to wage a new war. In particular, I think that the leaderships of the Muslim and the Serb nations will not dare attack the Croats again, because they know that such attempts have already failed once and backfired on them.

[Box, p 12]

Attempted Robbery

[Sutalo] The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina recently decided to distribute savings books with monthly sums of 400, 500, and 600 German marks to the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. How do you interpret that decision, and what has been done in order that the members of the HVO will have the same rights?

[Soljic] In the mildest words, that is attempted robbery. Whether the robbery will be successful, we shall see. When I say attempted robbery, I do not refer to the

soldiers, who deserve that compensation, but, if this compensation does not also apply to the members of the HVO, who have brought much more to the Federation than the Muslim army, I think that the distribution of those savings books, which will be done from common property, is pure robbery. We will answer to this move by compiling lists of the members of the HVO and MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the HRHB [Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia]. The compilation of these lists is underway. I must say that, however, nobody should rejoice in advance, because that is an unstable operation, without cover, on both sides. Those savings books are already being sold for a pittance. The Muslim side will probably try to make a certain effort, as pre-election propaganda, to buy votes for the elections, but we will not allow the distribution of compensation only to members of the Muslim army out of the common property.

[Box, p 13]

Nobody Has Been Indicted for Crimes Against the Croats

[Soljic] It is absurd that, so far, nobody has been indicted for crimes against the Croats, and that charges have been brought against Croats in central Bosnia, precisely in the area where most of the crimes against Croat civilians were committed and where the Croats, objectively, were in a position to defend themselves—because, they were surrounded by the Muslims, and the Muslims were not surrounded by the Croats. Everybody knows about the slaughters committed by Muslim extremists against Croatian civilians in Krizancevo Selo, Buhine Kuce, and Uzdol, not to list all of them. All that is well known, but no charges have been brought against the Muslim officials who were responsible, and charges have been brought against the Croats. That is a paradox and an injustice that hurts and offends. Those responsible should give it some thought.

B-H: Muslims Reportedly Beat Up Croat Police in Northeast

LD3007165796 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 30 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The extent to which the Muslims really do want the federation and equal rights with the Croats was clearly demonstrated today in the municipality of Ravne-Brcko. Here is a report by Mario Ivkic:

A group of Muslim extremists today beat up a police patrol from the Ravne-Brcko police station, while it was carrying out its regular police duties of ensuring public order and peace. The incident took place in Dubrave

in the municipality of Ravne-Brcko at the new market in the zone of separation just as Mijo Anic, head of Ravne-Brcko municipality, was visiting this market in the company of several IFOR [Implementation Force] officers, who together are planning to build a modern market in this place.

Commenting on this incident, Anic said: one can presume why such an incident took place and whose policy this represents. Someone is certainly bothered by the fact that in this area efforts are being made to ensure that law and order are introduced. This is another attempt to discredit the official Croat authorities in the Ravne-Brcko municipality. In any event, it is to be expected that all these dirty tricks will very soon come to light and be explained to the whole public.

That this is true is demonstrated by the behavior today of the Muslim police from the Tuzla security center, who quietly and with silent approval, looked on as the Croat police were attacked.

We have learned in the Ravne-Brcko police station that the names of the Muslim extremists are well-known: Enver Hasanbegovic was one of the most extreme in this attack. [passage omitted]

B-H: LBO Head: World Community 'Legitimizing' Ethnic Cleansing

AU3007083696 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1356 GMT 29 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 29 Jul (BETA)—Muhamed Filipovic, president of the Liberal Bosniak Organization (LBO), said today that the process of ethnic transformation of the area is still going on, without anybody seriously opposing it.

"The international community is helping the process of legitimizing ethnic cleansing by giving citizens the right to choose the place where they will vote," Filipovic said at a news conference, according to the report by the Sarajevo ONASA agency.

He added that the international community thereby makes possible "manipulations with the electorate with a view to ethnically restructuring the area."

According to Filipovic, the international community must ensure the return of refugees to their homes, because that is the most important condition for the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"In Mostar, the Croatian Democratic Community disputes the legal results of the local elections without any proof, whereby it does not respect the citizens' right to their own opinion," Filipovic said and added that there

have been attempts in Mostar to present electoral results along party lines.

He also said that only a common political strategy of democratic forces can guarantee the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Mostar Muslims Fear Renewal of Fighting

AU3007134496 Paris AFP in English
1329 GMT 30 Jul 96

[By Alexandra Haramina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 30—Muslims in the divided Bosnian city of Mostar fear that fighting with hostile Croat separatists will resume if the European Union withdraws its officials as threatened early next month, Muslims here told AFP Tuesday.

The European Union, which until earlier this month administered this divided southern Bosnian city, announced last week it will withdraw its officials from Mostar by Sunday if the hard-line leaders of separatist Bosnian Croats do not join the newly elected city council.

"I hope the Europeans don't leave the city because I'm sure there will be a new war," Emila, a 26-year-old unemployed Muslim woman said Wednesday. Mostar was devastated by Muslim-Croat fighting between 1993 and 1994, sparked by a bid by the Croats to carve out a separate Croat minstate in southern Bosnia.

After ending fighting in 1994, the Muslims and Croats formed an uneasy federation under pressure from Washington. But according to Samir, a 30-year-old Muslim: "The problem is the Croats don't want a federation with the Muslims. I am sure that if the Europeans leave, a new war will break out."

Elections, on June 30 and supervised by the Europeans who have administered Mostar since July 1994, voted in a joint city council. Croat parties won 16 seats and a Moslem-led coalition won 21. The Croats, based in west Mostar, then announced a boycott, refusing to attend the council because of alleged "irregularities" in the absentee vote by mainly Moslem Mostar refugees in the German city of Bonn.

Alarmed, Europe put pressure on Croatia, saying it would withdraw its officials by August 4 if the Bosnian Croats did not attend the council and relations between the European Union and Croatia—the sponsor of the Croats—would be damaged as a result.

The Croatian Government is keen to be allowed to join the main European institutions—the Council of Europe and European Union—but has so far been refused full or

associate membership, and Croatian authorities agreed to tackle the issue.

Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, held a meeting Monday with his Italian counterpart Lamberto Dini, telling reporters later an agreement on resolving the row was near. "The two parties must find a compromise before the date fixed by the European Union" he said, adding, "the decision of the constitutional court of the Muslim Croat Federation will be definitive."

In Mostar, the hard-line local Croats were meanwhile still hopeful Tuesday that the Europeans, who have always pushed for reunification of the city, would in fact withdraw. "If the Europeans clear off, the unification and Islamisation of Mostar will be delayed," said Blazenska, a 36-year-old Croat newspaper seller, working in Croat-held west Mostar, to a chorus of approval from her customers Tuesday.

Speaking in Sarajevo, the outgoing commander of NATO troops, Admiral Leighton Smith played down the threat of a resumption of fighting in Mostar or elsewhere in the troubled federation. "I do not see any evidence of anybody willing to take military action," he said.

European officials in Mostar said Tuesday that their mandate allows them to stay in the city only if the elected city council is allowed to function. If a resolution to the row is not found they will have to leave, one said Tuesday.

B-H: Bosnians, Croats Discuss Abolition of Herzeg-Bosna

AU3107100696 Paris AFP in English
0950 GMT 31 Jul 96

[By Sonia Bakaric]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, July 31 (AFP)—A top Bosnian delegation, backed by European and US officials, met leaders of the Croatian government Wednesday to discuss the abolition of the Bosnian Croat statelet in southern Bosnia, officials said here.

Ejup Ganic, the vice-president of Bosnia's Moslem-Croat federation, told reporters here "I have come here to demand the abolition of Herzeg-Bosna."

Ganic, accompanied by the US ambassador to Bosnia John Menzies and Michael Steiner, the deputy to the international envoy to Bosnia, Carl Bildt, led the Bosnian delegation.

They were welcomed at the Croatian presidency by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Foreign Minister Mate Granic, Defence Minister Gojko Susak, the Croat

president of the Moslem-Croat federation Kresimir Zubak and US ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith.

The meeting broke up after an hour, and was to be followed immediately, a Croat source said, by a meeting of the Croatian presidential council "dealing with the abolition of Herzeg-Bosna."

The source, who asked not to be named, declined to elaborate.

Herzeg-Bosna is the name for the separatist statelet set up by hardline nationalist Croats in southern Bosnia in 1993. The creation of the semi-state sparked a vicious war between Croats and Moslems in southern and central Bosnia.

Under the Dayton peace accord, Herzeg-Bosna was supposed to have been abolished at the start of this year.

The meeting follows a rise in tensions between Moslems and Croats in southern Bosnia, notably in the Bosnian city of Mostar, divided between Moslems and Croats.

The Croats are boycotting the newly-elected council over alleged electoral irregularities in the voting of refugees in the German city of Bonn and have asked the constitutional court of the Moslem-Croat Federation to rule on the issue.

Tudjman said at the weekend that he would "seriously consider" a recent EU warning that it would punish Croatia if the situation in Mostar was not resolved.

An official with the Bosnian delegation told reporters the welcome the Bosnian delegation had received from the Croats had been "very cold."

Ganic, accompanied by Menzies, last week led a delegation on a first post-war visit to the Serbian capital Belgrade. "We got a better welcome in Belgrade than in Zagreb," noted the official, who asked not to be named.

Relations between Moslems and Croats have long been tense despite the creation of a Moslem-Croat federation in 1994 after fighting ended.

The federation was set up under pressure from Washington, to act as a joint bulwark against the more powerful Bosnian Serbs, but has been slow to form largely because of Croat reluctance to merge their authorities with those of the larger Moslem population.

Zagreb has long been suspected by Sarajevo of expansionist plans in southern Bosnia and supported the breakaway bid of the Bosnian Croats.

The involvement of the American diplomats in the talks was the first time they had taken so public a role in Moslem-Croat affairs since the crisis in Mostar developed.

Ganic was meanwhile to hold a press conference in the Bosnian embassy in Zagreb midday Wednesday.

B-H: Bildt Sees Need for Continuing Military Role

*LD3007213596 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2126 GMT 30 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 30 (TANJUG)—The international community will have a significant military role in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the elections in September as well, high representative of the international community for Bosnia-Herzegovina Carl Bildt said Tuesday.

Speaking at a press conference in Brussels following a meeting of the E.U. committee for supervising the implementation of the Dayton accords, Bildt also said he believed some kind of security force would still be necessary in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the withdrawal of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in December, agencies reported. He said, however, that he did not see this presence as a continuation of the IFOR mission, the agencies said.

Bildt said the committee fully supported the E.U. stand on Mostar, where Croats are refusing to accept the results of the recent municipal elections.

The European Union has given Mostar Croats Aug. 4 as the deadline to accept the election results or it will pull out of this southern Bosnian town which is divided between Muslims and Croats. The European Union set up its administration in this town on the Neretva two years ago.

B-H: Plavsic Begins Election Campaign, Urges Votes for SDS

*AU3007203296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1758 GMT 30 Jul 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Prijedor, 30 July (BETA)—During her talks with the representatives of the municipal authorities, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and businessmen, Biljana Plavsic, acting president of the Serb Republic (RS), said that "it is necessary that the forthcoming election be won by the parties of national and patriotic orientation."

Plavsic's visit to Prijedor today marks the start of her election campaign for the post of RS president.

"The elections that are in front of us are not ordinary and have far greater importance since their results will represent the first official seal on the recognition of the RS, regardless of the fact that we will be within Bosnia-Herzegovina," Plavsic said.

According to her, the current borders, territory, and sovereignty of the RS and the town of Brcko are the greatest achievements of the three-year war, and they must be confirmed in the best possible way, by the majority of the voters giving their votes to the SDS.

"The best thing for the people in the RS would be if this party remained in power in the coming years because, in that period, we can resist all attempts to reintegrate the RS into Bosnia-Herzegovina," Plavsic said.

She said that the Dayton agreement is the best document offered by the international community and that the Serb side will implement it consistently.

"The Dayton agreement was reached at the time when we were in the worst military situation. All other plans offered to us by the international community were offered when we were superior on the battlefields and when we held 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and were far worse," the acting RS president said.

Plavsic also spoke of the "impermissibly slow settlement of the problem of Serb prisoners and missing fighters and civilians."

She also said that there are some illogical things in the implementation of the peace agreement regarding the announced freedom of movement on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"For the time being, the freedom of movement is taking place without almost any problems only on the territory of the RS, while no citizen of our republic can venture onto the territory of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, since he is immediately arrested or mistreated," Plavsic concluded.

B-H: Plavsic on Elections, Federal, International Relations

LD3007135096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1217 GMT 30 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prijedor, 30 Jul (SRNA)—Biljana Plavsic, acting president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said in Prijedor today that the results of the forthcoming elections would confirm the existence and sovereignty of the Serb Republic, in line with the Dayton agreement.

During a meeting with representatives of the Prijedor municipal authorities, Serb Democratic Party (SDS; ruling Bosnian Serb party), war veterans, refugees, and Prijedor businessmen, Plavsic said that "borders, territory, sovereignty, and Brcko are the minimum and the Serb people cannot accept less."

"Almost without any risk, the SDS can preserve and defend what it has won in the war because our victims and 400,000 refugees in the Serb Republic must not be forgotten," she said.

Plavsic stressed the part of the Dayton agreement devoted to POW's "because the Muslim and the Croat side have not disbanded all their prisons and secured unhindered exhumation of mass graves."

She also said that representatives of the international community were constantly insisting on freedom of movement, adding that "in practice, freedom of movement is granted only to the citizens of the Muslim-Croat Federation, while the citizens of the Serb Republic do not enjoy the same right in the territory of the Federation."

"Representatives of the international community like to have contacts with local authorities as a way of making assessments which they later take advantage of in talks with state bodies and leaders," Plavsic said.

The acting president of the Serb Republic once again drew attention to the tendentious use of the term—reintegration—which, as she put it, could not be found in the Dayton agreement.

"This is a serious attempt at deceiving the Serb people since there is no mechanism for achieving it," Plavsic said.

Her visit to Prijedor today marks the beginning of her election campaign as the SDS candidate for the post of president of the Serb Republic.

She said that the coming elections were not "ordinary since their importance goes far beyond the run-of-the-mill selection of candidates for bodies at local and higher levels."

"The international community will try everything bar force to find a political group that would carry out its wishes and will therefore favor such parties. But I believe that our people will not allow themselves to be deceived and will vote for the party that will and knows how to safeguard and defend all that we made sacrifices for," Dr. Plavsic said.

This afternoon Plavsic will visit Ljubija for meetings with the local population and refugees. Later on she will visit Kozarac for a meeting with Serb refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina [former Serb-held region of Croatia].

B-H: Plavsic Rejects 'Integration' With Bosnian Federation

LD3007170396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1445 GMT 30 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prijedor, 30 Jul (TANJUG)—Biljana Plavsic, acting president of the Serb Republic, today paid a visit to Prijedor where she had talks with local political officials and businessmen. Their talks laid particular emphasis on the need to revive production.

"That is the only way of securing funds for the implementation of the economic restructuring program and for strengthening social welfare funds," Plavsic said.

With reference to the forthcoming elections, she emphasized the need to strengthen the national front of the Serb people whose victory in the September elections would mean the definitive recognition of the statehood of the Serb Republic.

Rejecting the thesis of the future integration with the Muslim-Croat federation, the acting Serb Republic president said that blending into Bosnia would pose a latent danger of fresh genocide against the Serb people. She went on to say that such links are being encouraged by outside pressure which is aimed at weakening as much as possible the national feeling of the Serb people in the Serb Republic.

"This policy must not be supported by any political party in the Serb Republic which is in favor of achieving our national interest," Plavsic said in talks with local officials and businessmen in Prijedor.

In the course of her visit to this area, Plavsic toured refugee centers in Ljubija and Kozarac and gained a personal insight into the living conditions in these centers.

B-H: Plavsic, Buha, Krajsnik Called Karadzic's 'Marionettes'

AU3007141196 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jul 96 p 2

[Commentary by Sejad Luckin: "Karadzic Behind a Curtain"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Richard Holbrooke cannot be very satisfied with the results of his latest mission to Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Zagreb. He even admitted this in his comments following the resignation of Radovan Karadzic from his presidential posts in the Serb Republic and the Serb Democratic Party (SDS). Holbrooke had not achieved his main goal, that is, he had not forced Belgrade to extradite the leader of the Pale regime to the International Tribunal in The Hague.

No Boycott

True, during his latest tour, the creator of the Dayton peace agreement proved to be considerably more effective than the numerous diplomats who have all tried to remove Karadzic. With instructions he probably received from the leading men of the U.S. Administration—Bill Clinton and Warren Christopher—he made the poet from the mount, Durnitor [Karadzic], finally sign two resignations and oblige himself to a complete withdrawal from public life.

At the same time, he removed, it seems, the main obstacle for the September elections. A majority of parties from the Federation were ready to boycott those elections if Karadzic remained on the political scene, and Izetbegovic clearly told Holbrooke this during his visit to Sarajevo. The SDS has prepared countermeasures—which could be unfavorable for the peace process—in case the threat by OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] head Robert Frowick, about the ban on SDS participation in the September elections, comes true.

It is important to add to all this the classical terroristic threats from Pale, namely, that international policemen would be not detained but killed if anybody tried to forcefully arrest Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic and extradite them to The Hague. The explosive hidden under an international police vehicle in Vlasenica was a signal that Pale was not joking. As one could expect from such a world power, the United States responded sharply to the threats of blackmail from Pale, but only declaratively. In practice, it attempted to calm the unpleasant situation with Holbrooke's diplomatic mission, and with trade, which is an integral part of such talks.

Therefore, the only real dilemma that remains after Karadzic's resignations have been made public, is what Slobodan Milosevic and Belgrade got out of it. All other relations in the complicated reality of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although they now may be expressed in some brighter, more optimistic nuances, have not significantly changed. Particularly not in Pale. Karadzic's heirs, Biljana Plavsic at the head of the Serb Republic and Aleksa Buha at the head of the SDS, are Karadzic's most loyal followers, and there should be no doubt that they will continue with his policy of ethnic and territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, during the past six years, since the formation of the SDS up until the [coming] elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they have been on the front lines fighting for Serb rights.

The international community, obviously, has failed to use the shock of the Dayton peace agreement

to facilitate the removal of persons accused of war crimes; in fact, by procrastinating in that endeavor, the international community has enabled them to further strengthen their power.

Outcasts and Marionettes

That can best be seen in the case of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. With a series of orchestrated rallies of support, they have created for themselves images of national heroes and have convinced the Serb people that an attack on the leaders is an attack on the people. This was evidenced during IFOR's [Implementation Force] short siege of the army barracks in Han Pijesak.

In the past seven months, Karadzic has eliminated from his political and state headquarters all those who were hesitant and replaced them with attested Serb zealots. He sacked Rajko Kasagic [former prime minister]; he sent to anonymity Nikola Koljevic, who is only formally the vice president of the Serb Republic; and he split with the mayor of Banja Luka, Predrag Radic.... Biljana Plavsic, who may not have brought the Russian poet Limonov to shoot at the citizens of Sarajevo, but who kissed Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan [paramilitary leader from Serbia] after the massacre of the Bosniaks in Bijeljina, came to the forefront. Then there is also Gojko Klickovic; the role of Momcilo Krajisnik has been strengthened; and Velibor Ostojic has been promoted. Aleksa Buha, a member of the famous Serb clan from the pre-war philosophical faculty in Sarajevo, is one of those fans, too.

All of them are nothing but marionettes, whom Karadzic, now hidden behind the curtain, keeps on a string. He remained in Pale and in Bosnia-Herzegovina which is crucial for his role, and he can dictate further developments from the shadows. Holbrooke's mission removed his picture, but not the thoughts. Karadzic's residence will certainly be the address at which Plavsic, Krajisnik, Klickovic and Buha will often call upon.

Dayton at a Test

The authorities in Sarajevo—although they may consider themselves winners—cannot completely relax after Holbrooke's mission, nor should they believe that the last barrier for the creation of a democratic climate in the Serb Republic has been removed. The Americans will no doubt try to convince Izetbegovic and his assistants that nothing else could be won because, objectively, any further pressure on Pale could have turned into a confrontation with Russia, and gradual steps are more diplomatic. Holbrooke himself announced that the job had not been finished and that Karadzic had not been sent off to the Hague. Maybe that move has been postponed for after the U.S. elections.

In order for that to come true, in the next few months it will be necessary to prepare new pressures to put on Milosevic. The last week clearly showed that he is not all that firm. In the interval between this and the next tour of Holbrooke, or somebody like him, the public of Serbia should forget about the latest concessions of their president, and Milosevic should try to convince the public that it was not a bad deal. There has been speculation that he received economic aid in return for Karadzic's resignations and that the Brcko corridor has been guaranteed to him. The former concession is easily possible. The latter should be doubted, because the question of Brcko is subject to international arbitration in the future. It is unlikely that Holbrooke would dare to make such a promise which goes directly against the Dayton agreement, a document which, after all, has been the basis for all U.S. actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Serbs Hand War Crime Files Implicating Izetbegovic to Hague

*LD3007140796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1247 GMT 30 Jul 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 30 Jul (SRNA)—The Bosnian Serb Republic has handed over 300 files on war crimes against Serb civilians to the Hague Tribunal, Bosnian Serb Republic Deputy Justice Minister Goran Neskovic said.

"Among the accused are Muslim leader Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, deputy Muslim Prime Minister Ejup Ganic [title as received], Chief of General Staff Rasim Delic [of the Bosnian army], and Naser Oric, head of the former Muslim enclave of Srebrenica," Neskovic said in an interview published today by VECERNJE NOVOSTI.

"Izetbegovic is responsible for crimes committed against the Serbs held in Celebic camp near Konjic in 1992. At least 14 Serbs were killed and others were tortured in this camp," he said. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serbs Attack UN Bus in Banja Luka

*AU3007143196 Paris AFP in English
1413 GMT 30 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, July 30 (AFP)—A Serb mob armed with iron bars, sticks and stones attacked a UN bus carrying passengers from the Moslem-Croat federation into a Serb-held town, a UN official said Tuesday. Windows including the windshield on the bus were smashed but attempts by the mob to hem the vehicle in were foiled by the quick reactions of the Danish driver, said a spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who organized the bus service. "As the bus pulled in the mob attacked it. The

driver tried to turn the bus around and had to smash a car which was trying to block it in out of the way," UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski explained.

All the passengers escaped unhurt, Janowski said, although one woman in the mob was "bumped" by the bus in the melee and was said to have received hospital treatment.

Janowski said the attack in the Serb-controlled town of Banja Luka was "clearly orchestrated," calling it an "outrageous attempt to stop freedom of movement by the (Bosnian Serb) authorities."

The UNHCR operates six similar bus services between different towns in Bosnia that cross former front lines. The aim is to link up families and encourage contact between the two communities living on opposite sides of the boundary line separating the Serb and Moslem-Croat halves of post-war Bosnia.

B-H: Doboj Warns Clinton of IFOR-Caused Environmental Hazards

*LD3107115096 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1126 GMT 31 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Doboj, July 31 (TANJUG)—
The civil defence of nine cities in the Doboj district (in

the north of the Republika Srpska, the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina) addressed on Wednesday a letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton to warn him of the harmful environmental effects of IFOR's aircraft.

Planes, helicopters and other aircraft taking off and landing on ships stationed in the Adriatic Sea, pollute air and earth, destroy vegetation and animals, contaminate water and endanger our health and life, the letter said.

The letter said that air, water, earth and forests in the Balkans, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, had been among the least polluted in Europe but that, unfortunately, the situation had changed.

We believe that you would not allow this if you knew about the effects caused by IFOR's and NATO's aircraft, the letter said.

They urged the U.S. President to consider the letter as their appeal for help.

Croatia: Tudjman Receives Bosnian Federation Vice President

LD3107104096 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 31 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, the president of the Republic of Croatia, has received Ejup Ganic, the vice president of the [Muslim-Croat] Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the latter's request.

After hearing Ganic's opinion on the situation in the federation, President Tudjman said that the problems had to be solved in talks between the federal partners, Croats and Bosniaks [Muslims].

The Republic of Croatia strongly backs the consistent and full implementation of the agreements signed in Dayton and Washington, particularly the agreement on the strengthening of the federation and its links with the Republic of Croatia, the president said.

The Republic of Croatia will continue to play a constructive role in implementing Washington and Dayton [agreements], but it is impermissible to blame the Croats for the activities of the circles that want to compromise Dayton, President Tudjman said.

He said that the existing problems should be solved in talks between representatives of the Croats and Bosniaks from the federation as well as the joint council for cooperation between Croatia, the [Muslim-Croat] federation and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was established for this very purpose.

Croatia: Paris Threatens Tudjman With Sanctions

LD3007195296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1817 GMT 30 Jul 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Paris, July 30 (TANJUG)—France has called for an introduction of sanctions against Croatia and Bosnian Croats if they persist in their blockade of Mostar, a city in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is under EU administration.

France's request will be examined in Brussels by the committee for the implementation of the civilian provisions of the Dayton Agreement. International Community's [word indistinct] representative is expected to submit a report to the committee.

Paris is very dissatisfied with Croatia's capricious reaction to a demand by the European Union to end the Croat boycott of the Mostar City Council.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has rejected a EU demand on Mostar's unification and even said that Croatia would not be humiliated for a handful of ECUs.

Croat leader in Mostar Brajkovic also said that Bosnian Croats would not yield to the EU ultimatum.

The EU firmly plans to terminate the EU administration in Mostar unless the Croat blockade ends by August 3.

Commentators in Paris said on Tuesday that the developments in Croat-Muslim relations were an indication that the federation stood no long-term chances and that both sides were even resorting to 'political terrorism.'

Croatia: UN Commander Expects E. Slavonia Presence Until Jul 97

LD3007212396 Brussels La Une Radio Network in French 1600 GMT 30 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgian General Jozef Schoups, commander of the 5,000 UN peacekeepers in eastern Slavonia in northeastern Croatia, is in Belgium for a few days. He met the defense minister today. There are 900 Belgians in the peacekeeping contingent, who are responsible for monitoring the demilitarization of the Serb-occupied zones. This was completed in June; now, the task is to supervise elections and prepare for the return of refugees. This could require another year, according to General Schoups. He spoke to our reporter, Francoise Lenbach.

[Begin recording] [Schoups] Those living there, the local Serbs, look upon my troops as being their army, which has disappeared. That is how we have been accepted. And if there is some hope for continuing law and order, and confidence in our troops, and if it (?remains that way), it is thanks to our presence. I am not about to sacrifice order for a premature return of our soldiers. I can foresee at the very least a continuing presence of 5,000 soldiers until after the elections.

[Lenbach] So you think that the Belgian troops will remain in eastern Slavonia until at least July 1997?

[Schoups] According to my forecast, I think it is realistic to plan for an end to the mission at the end of July 1997, yes. [end recording]

Croatia: Government Office To Open in Serb-Held Enclave

AU3107084596 Beli Manastir Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 29 Jul 96

[Report on meeting between (Tom Cardgough), head of the UNTAES civilian affairs, and Vaso Zigic, president of the "executive council of the Beli Manastir municipal

assembly," by unidentified correspondent on 29 July; place not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] The successful cooperation between the Baranja authorities and the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] civilian affairs representatives in the consistent implementation of the provisions of the Erdut-Zagreb Agreement continued tonight with a meeting between an UNTAES civilian sector team and Vaso Zigic, president of the executive council of the Beli Manastir municipal assembly.

This was also the first meeting between the new head of civilian affairs for Baranja, (Tom Cardgough), with the officials from our area. We apologize for the bad reception you will have of this report.

[Unidentified reporter] Vaso Zigic, president of the executive council of the Beli Manastir municipal assembly, received the new head of the UNTAES civilian affairs, (Tom Cardgough), former Sierra Leone ambassador to the UN, who replaced (Wojciech Kaluza) in that position, as well as Gerard Fisher, head of UNTAES civilian affairs for the Serb province, with his associates.

Zigic pointed out to his guests that the Serb side is determined to persist in consistently implementing the principles of the basic agreement on eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, and added that he expects Serb positions and proposals to be acknowledged to a greater extent.

Gerard Fisher announced that the UNTAES civilian affairs team in Baranja would soon expand, with the intention of carrying out the upcoming tasks faster.

The head of UNTAES civilian affairs also raised the issue of the upcoming opening of the Croatian Government office; as he said, it is supposed to be opened around 10 August, at Croatian insistence. He also said that there was an agreement on that with Vojislav Stanimirovic, president of the executive council of the Serb province, as well as an agreement on repairing the gas station in Bilje and opening an exchange office within the next 15 days or so.

Gerard Fisher emphasized that the Croatian-Serb agreement, reached at the provincial level, anticipates a team of people to work at the office, and also that there would be no symbols or statehood insignia [as heard].

Vaso Zigic, president of the executive council, emphasized again that the Serb side would, in accordance with the Erdut-Zagreb Agreement, insist on the return of all the Serbs to their homes or a just compensation for their property.

"The finances for revitalization of the economy are irreparably late," said Zigic, "even though the representatives of the transitional administration and Fisher himself often issue consoling statement saying that the funds should arrive within two or three weeks."

Gerard Fisher welcomed Zigic's idea on the need for the province to establish economic ties with the broader community soon, adding that this is why General Jacques Klein is travelling to Brussels tomorrow, where he is supposed to get the promised \$10 million. "All the preparations have been made; we should be getting the money within two or three weeks," said Fisher. "All we can do is wait."

(Tom Cardgough), the new head of civilian affairs, would not comment his appointment to the new position. He said he would issue a statement upon officially taking the position, in early August.

Croatia: E. Slavonia Officials Satisfied With UNTAES Response

AU3107092296 *Beli Manastir Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 29 Jul 96*

[Report on public forum held by "provincial" and Bilje community officials on the current situation by unidentified correspondent in Bilje on 29 July]

[FBIS Translated Text] A public forum is under way in Bilje; attended by representatives of our province and the municipal government as well as members of the executive council of the [Bilje] community and the people of this Baranja village. Our colleague has further details.

[Unidentified reporter] As (?proposed) last week, a meeting is under way in Bilje; apart from Vaso Zigic, president of the executive council of the Beli Manastir municipality, and members of the executive council of the Bilje community, Petar Djukic, head of the transitional police forces in the Srem-Baranja province, and Petar Ivanovic, secretary of the municipal secretariat for Beli Manastir municipal affairs, are also present.

Although General Klein was also supposed to attend, he set off for Brussels today, as was heard yesterday at the great and—according to the many statements that were also be heard here—dignified rally in Vukovar. As he himself said, he expects that international financial circles will finally realize that there has been enough talk and promises, and that it is time for concrete financial aid if the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] is to justify its mandate.

In a [word indistinct] and open atmosphere, the participants of the meeting have analyzed the situation in

Bilje, which, in the past several days, threatened to escalate into something that would in no way be in the interest of the Serb people. Vaso Zigic appealed for a serious approach to the problems since, as he said, it is imperative that the Serb people stay in the area.

It was stated today that the executive council's suggestion to the UNTAES that Mr. (Wojciech Kaluza), head of UNTAES civilian affairs in Baranja, be replaced, has been adopted, which shows that the work has been serious and that the opinions and positions of the executive council of the Beli Manastir municipality and its president are being accepted. Mr. Kaluza is believed to be the direct culprit for making the decision, to which he did not give enough thought, to mediate in Branislav [as heard] Glavas's [Branimir Glavas, head of the Osijek-Baranja County] visit to Bilje, which, in turn, caused unrest and protest among the local people, who threatened to leave the territory.

Viewing the current situation, Djukic emphasized the importance of General Klein's optimism and good intentions, which was recently evident when, at his insistence, the Serb citizen arrested at the highway at the border crossing with the Republic of Croatia was released. Explaining the functioning of the transitional police forces, Djukic stated that the police forces are professionally trained to carry out their tasks. He emphasized that in future negotiations, which are necessary, the Republic of Croatia must be made to observe all human rights, and that, using both the Dayton Accord and the Erdut Agreement, it must be ensured that the Serb people will stay, but at the same time the will of the other nationalities, to whom, as he said, the Serb people have always shown understanding, goodwill, and good intentions, must be respected.

The meeting, which started at 1700 [1500 GMT], has continued with questions put by members of the Bilje community.

Croatia: UNTAES Criticized Over Incident at Bilje
AU3007193796 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR
in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jul 96 p 16

[Commentary by Boris Komadina: "Reintegration—With a Stone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "A happening of the people" is a syntactic element that awakens unpleasant memories in each of us, such "happenings" preceded Serbian aggression first on Croatia and then on Bosnia-Herzegovina. After four years of conflicts and the final military collapse of the Greater Serbian ideology in Operation Storm, the Serbs have once again staged the famous "happening of the people." This time on the territory under protection of UNTAES [UN Transitional

Administration in Eastern Slavonia] and the Transitional Administration in the Croatian village of Bilje. On 24 July, the village of Bilje, which is part of the pilot program for the return of displaced persons to Baranja, was supposed to be the meeting point of the delegations of the human rights commissions from both the Croatian and Serbian sides that are active within the framework of UNTAES. In front of the local school, where the meeting was to take place, a large group of women and children (a favorite Serbian move at such gatherings) gathered, who, apart from insulting the representatives of the Croatian delegation, shouted slogans like "This is Serbia." The tension grew from moment to moment, and when the male component of the pep-talkers joined women and children, they went "from words to deeds." Stoned and humiliated, the Croatian delegation sat on the bus and went to Osijek.

Bilje, which, until 1991, was almost completely populated by the Croats (90 percent), was not accidentally chosen for a demonstration of "the will of the Serb nation." After a relatively successful start to the mission, the UNTAES mandate, and the Transitional Administration headed by Klein, the rebel Serbs have, on several occasions, unsuccessfully tried to slow the process of peaceful reintegration or divert it to another track. So far, all those attempts have been on the margins of political methods, like the pompously announced "Vukovar Declaration," in which they demanded, in the form of an ultimatum, a wide political autonomy. The fiasco of that, their last, attempt to slow the process of peaceful reintegration by using political means, represented the beginning of the obstruction of the UNTAES mandate by various pressures and blackmailing.

The case of "Bilje" is primarily a message for the retired U.S. General Klein, the first man of the Transitional Administration and the UNTAES forces, which says that the transitional administrator, in the occupied territory of Croatian Podunavlje [Danube River basin], has as much power as the Serbs themselves give him. It is clear that, in such a situation, one cannot at all talk about the realization of already agreed pilot programs for the return of displaced persons. "The happening of the people" in Bilje has also shown that the Serbs turn to the tried-and-tested practice of pressure. It is interesting that the representatives of the Croatian state have already met with the representatives of the local Serbs in Bilje on a couple of occasions, and there have been no incidents.

Eight Serb policemen who were "securing" the meeting in Bilje and several UNTAES members calmly watched the stoning of the Croatian delegation. One can expect that the police and military structures of the UNTAES there will be insufficiently decisive to provide the con-

ditions for the peaceful reintegration of Croatian Podunavlje into the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia in line with their mandate. However, when members of UNTAES silently watch Croatian officials being stoned, that is going beyond the limits of what should be expected. The demand of the Transitional Administration that Croatia should participate in financing some of the expenses of the UNTAES operation is, thus, even more absurd and, in the end, is cynical. The message of the Croatian Government, in an answer to that demand, is the only one possible. It reads as follows: "The volume of financing, by the Republic of Croatia, will depend upon the success of the operation."

Bilje has shown exactly what point the process of peaceful reintegration had reached. The results of the UNTAES so far are minor in relation to the job that is to follow and what is yet to be done in order for the displaced persons to return safely to their homes soon.

Croatia: Amnesty Law Blocks Return of Serbs to Krajina

LD2507182696 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1642 GMT 25 Jul 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 25 (TANJUG)—Massive return of Serbs to Krajina has been blocked by the Croatian law on amnesty, a representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) told a news conference here on Thursday.

Marwan Elkhoury of the UNHCR Belgrade office said that Croatia and its President Franjo Tudjman, being signatories to the Dayton agreement, were obligated to enable all refugees to return.

Elkhoury said that his office had so far returned to Croatia no more than 41 refugees, while it was processing 1,000 requests by persons willing to go back.

The UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross were preparing a project of the Serbs' return to Krajina, Elkhoury said and added that, if the project succeeded, around 40,000 people would return to Krajina before the winter.

About 250,000 Serbs escaped from the Serb Krajina during the Croatian Army's aggression last year.

Croatia: Kuplensko Muslim Refugee Camp To Close 31 Jul

LD2907213296 Zagreb HTV Television
in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 29 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The deadline for closing the Kuplensko refugee camp is 31 July, after which the presence of refugees in Kuplensko will no longer be tolerated, Ante Soljic, head of the special police of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs, stated in Sisak.

There are approximately 2,000 refugees from Velika Kladusa and the Bihac pocket still in the refugee camp near Vojnic. Refugees from Kuplensko will be given the choice of moving to refugee camps near Osijek and Sibenik or joining their families in a third country; those who turn down both options will be deported to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatia: Italy's Investment Opportunities Analyzed

BR3007113096 Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE (EUROPA supplement) in Italian 26 Jul 96 p VI

[Report by Elena Ragusin]

[FBIS Translated Text] The return to normality will be slow and difficult. Croatia is trying to emerge from the tunnel of the war that, from 1991 until last year, disrupted its economic and social system; but it will take years to heal the wounds caused by its violent separation from Belgrade.

Only one-third of Croatian territory was directly affected by the Serbian occupation which—apart from in the Vukovar area, which is due to return to Croatian sovereignty within the next two years—ended in 1995, following the Zagreb army's offensive in which the territories of western Slavonia and Krajina were liberated. The industrial area of Zagreb, the whole of Istria, and the productive areas of northeastern Croatia were never involved in the war with Belgrade. Nevertheless industrial output fell 90 percent from 1990 through 1995 and investments in the production sector fell 400 percent.

The recovery began in the second half of last year. GDP, which was \$15 billion in 1994, increased 1.4 percent, and the forecast for the current year is of an increase of 4.5 percent.

The war certainly did not facilitate investments. From the day independence was proclaimed in June 1991, 9,830 joint enterprises were created in Croatia. Italy occupies second place in terms of numbers of investments—1,438—with 983 of them in the form of joint ventures. But these are mainly small enterprises or service companies. German investments occupy first

place, with a total of 1,596. Overall, only 100 million German marks [DM] were invested.

Apart from the "national risk," which until a few months ago was very great because of the conflict with Belgrade, Italian businessmen complain about the lack of government support. "Italian businessmen's interest in Croatia is growing," according to the officials of the ICE [Foreign Trade Institute] office in Zagreb. This interest was confirmed by Luigi Guarda, chairman of Informest [expansion unknown]. "We receive many requests from businessmen interested in joint ventures, in industrial cooperation, and in export agreements, but we lack the financial and insurance resources," according to the chairman of Gorizia's services and documentation firm, which helps Italian enterprises wanting to enter the markets of the East.

According to Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Piero Fassino, this problem should be surmounted very soon. "We intend to support our enterprises by strengthening ICE and SACE [Export Credit Insurance Agency]," Fassino said last week on his return from an official visit to Croatia. The coming months will also see the signing of a bilateral agreement on the protection of investments and dual taxation.

At present Croatian legislation sets no restrictions on foreign investments, which can total 100 percent of company capital, apart from certain strategic industries such as defense, energy, transport, banking, and insurance. The Croatian tax system envisages a 25-percent tax on profits, and most goods are subject to VAT at 18 percent. Concessions are envisaged for investments in the areas of Croatia that returned to Zagreb's sovereignty last year and that were hard hit by the war.

Hitherto 2,554 enterprises have been privatized, representing a total estimated capital of DM24 billion, but only 46 percent is in private hands. This is a factor that has further curbed foreign investments. According to many observers, the influence of the state (or, rather, of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], Presi-

dent Franjo Tudjman's party) in the Croatian economic system is still too great.

According to a study published by Informest in its business guide on Croatia, the present average cost of an industrial warehouse in the Zagreb area is DM1,400 per square meter and falls to DM1,000 in the more outlying areas of the country. Average net earnings are around DM450 per month, but labor costs are almost doubled by contributions and taxes. The unemployment level is still high, at 17.8 percent, but the Croatian authorities hope that the situation will improve as soon as the international community gives the go-ahead to the reconstruction aid envisaged by the Dayton peace accords on Bosnia.

The war caused damage which the Croatian Government estimates to be in excess of \$30 billion. The largest slice of aid will be allocated to restoring highway and railroad infrastructures: U.S. and German firms are already active in this field, but Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic recently said that he will support Italian firms wanting to contribute to the reconstruction of roads and railroads. There is much interest on the part of foreign investors in the tourist industry, which before the war granted Croatia revenue in foreign currency worth some \$3 billion a year.

On the trade front, Italy is already Croatia's second largest partner, after Germany, with regard to exports, and in the first half of 1995 it leaped to first place with regard to imports. We imported goods worth \$587 million (24.8 percent) as against exports worth \$693 million (18.7 percent). The latest figures, which are not yet available, should be even more favorable for Italy, because the overvaluation of the Croatian currency, the kuna, continues to depress Croatian exports.

The prospects for the Croatian economy and its potential for attracting foreign capital have hitherto been dependent on the political normalization and on the Zagreb government's ability to provide a secure legal and regulatory framework for those wanting to invest in Croatia.

FYROM: Advantages of Joining NATO Cited

AU3007160496 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian
27-28 Jul 96 p 11

[Commentary by Nano Ruzin: "NATO Amid Security, Democracy, and Prosperity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recent frequent texts, polemics, roundtables, and television broadcasts prepared by our leading experts on NATO raise various questions among the common readers as well as a number of foreign diplomats: Is NATO anti-Russian, as it used to be in the period of its anti-Sovietism a few decades before? Is NATO anti-European (Europe to the Europeans, NATO to the Americans)? Is NATO expressed only through its military strategy or does it have broader connotation? These dilemmas are truly challenging, although the doctrine of the North Atlantic alliance is completely clear. Perhaps we are still not familiar enough with NATO and its evolution. What are the actual reasons for so many dilemmas?

The common weakness in all these dilemmas is the fact that a large number of our domestic experts see NATO through the prism of the Cold War, strategic competition, and narrow military logic that can be negatively reflected on international public opinion about Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]: NATO is neither anti-Russian, nor anti-European (on the contrary, even France, which had reservations toward NATO, joined without any dilemmas), and finally NATO is a much broader concept than just military and strategic, which has been thoroughly elaborated by Defense Minister Handziski so many times.

What does NATO actually represent?

Observing it from an intellectual, ethical, or emotional angle, democracy in either its individual or collective manifestations is one of the generators of eternal doubts that man has regarding the present moment, prosperity, and justice. It is exactly the rights, prosperity, the present, and democracy that we find in NATO's tissue. It is an alliance that unites nations that are affiliated to democracy as a system in whose frameworks the principle of consensus does not just mean free choice, but also respect for the will of others. NATO is an alliance whose aim is defense, promotion, and progress of democracy. It is an alliance that exists because its foundation is made of democracy, and its enlargement is a question of democracy, as Romanian Petre Roman emphasizes. Ultimately, it is an alliance that simultaneously guarantees collective defense or collective security to its members, but before all it guarantees democracy. So, admission in NATO implies maintenance and development of this

impressive fulfillment of human reality as is democracy (a term that was created on the European continent, in the Balkans, in Antique Greece).

After the fall of communism in Europe in 1989 and the fall of the USSR, the geographical and political profile of the continent was changed. The withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the territories of the former socialist states, as well as the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, changed the geographical and political map of Central and East Europe. The period of postcommunism in the nineties was marked on the international level with intensification of confidence among the Western and the new European democracies. However, after the end of the Cold War, in whose frameworks the global relations among the superpowers and their satellites were strictly determined and predictable, the multilateral international and security order created a tense psychology of unpredictability and insecurity among the postcommunist states. The new democracies remained without their security umbrella that could provide for a stable development of transition (for the moment the Republic of Macedonia is offered a strategic security by the preventive deployment forces, UNPREDEP).

So, it is logical for the postcommunist countries to see the safest solution from the aspect of military and strategic security (but not only from the aspect of military and strategic security) in their admission to NATO. This ambition has become a reality after NATO had decided to conduct its own restructuring and to redefine its role with a strategy and doctrine that are based on admission of new members, which are recruited among the postcommunist states. There is no doubt that after its enlargement NATO will continue with the reforms that it started a couple of years ago. This transformation was imposed by the big changes in the international community, in whose framework NATO is trying to evade the fate of the Warsaw Pact. Actually, NATO had started the changes a long time ago: With the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the strategy of military operations was changed with "out-of-area," that is, operations outside the zones of the alliance, in which there were created multinational, interservice military forces, as well as the Council of North Atlantic Cooperation and the Partnership for Peace Program.

The essence of the evolution of the alliance up to now, as well as the promptness and ambitions of the Republic of Macedonia for membership to NATO, urge us to draw conclusions that will help clarify a number of dilemmas that some of the leading theoreticians in our state are facing:

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The enlargement is not only a matter of a decision of the members of the alliance or a political will of the leaders and the ruling teams in the new democracies, but it is also a question of a political consensus and of public opinion in the respective state. There are two aspects of great importance concerning our state: On the one hand, the positive view of the political parties (in spite of some minor oscillations among the opposition parties) and the public opinion vis-a-vis NATO has not been changed, regardless of some events on the international political scene, as for instance, Russia's objections to NATO's expansion in the Balkans and at large, while on the other hand, the popularity of NATO in the mass media, particularly among the young people, is constantly rising.

This specific situation is characteristic of nearly all young democracies, and therefore their political peaks are faced with gigantic missions for the intensification of such an orientation of the young generation for reaching the common goal: Full integration into a stable and prosperous world. On the other hand, this does not mean that there may not appear some conservative and reactionary circles that might be against membership in the alliance.

The new political elites of the young democracies, including the Republic of Macedonia, are convinced that only admission in NATO can facilitate quickly overcoming the challenges of transition and secure the future of democracy in their countries. Normally, the positive economic trends would be imposed, because with the enlargement of NATO, capital would find its political, economic, and international security that NATO can guarantee. So, parallel with the climate of security and stability, the enlargement of NATO implies a psychological security for the foreign investors who are convinced that wherever the Alliance is there is economic prosperity and democracy. Furthermore, it would speed up transition, economic progress, and development in these states, including the Republic of Macedonia.

Finally, today it is illogical, ridiculous, and contrary to NATO's doctrine to affirm the thesis that admission in NATO guarantees "protection from fears of Russia or neighbors" as some domestic military doctrines emphasize. On the contrary, Russia is a cosigner of the Partnership for Peace Program, and most probably all the other states in the Balkans will start on the same road. Today it is also illogical to observe "Russia and the other states in the Balkans and at large that have not signed the Partnership for Peace Program" as enemies of NATO, as a neighborly hypothesis claims, or that the alliance is oriented against them.

So, the admission of the Republic of Macedonia in NATO will not just provide security from a hypothetical adventure of "returning to the old system" or to the "rule of nationalism." It will not just provide a security umbrella, but will first of all be a means for modernization of the entire society and association with the industrialized nations. Finally, this process, observed from an international and political aspect, is directed toward a solid association of these countries, including the Republic of Macedonia, with the West, without leaving a possibility for going back.

In conclusion, I would add another argument that is not to be underestimated, and it is the fact that all Europe is marked by the process of stability and prosperity that is guaranteed by NATO, as an institution and a family to which the Republic of Macedonia tends. If our state manages to become a full member of NATO in the framework of a short- or medium-term plan, a very prosperous road to more easily overcoming our most sensitive questions and problems will be opened. In this direction, the facts listed, as well as those that have not been thoroughly elaborated in this text, are aimed at explaining the legitimacy of the efforts of the Republic of Macedonia for becoming a full member of the alliance to those who are either suspicious or uncertain regarding the orientation of the present Macedonian leadership toward NATO.

FYROM: Commentary Views Relations With U.S., Russia

AU3007133696 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian
27-28 Jul 96 p 3

[Commentary by Branko Geroski: "The West Does Not Want Us, the East Courts Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Was it the alleged "strong" and "hostile" statements of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] foreign minister, Ljubomir Frckovski, toward Russia (Liberal leader Andov called them "childish," while VMRO-DPMNE's [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] leader called them "nonserious"), the alleged anti-Russian campaign in the mass media, or some other more serious reason that caused Yuri Trushin, the Russian diplomatic representative in Skopje, to continue to claim that the mass media and some politicians here are openly waging an anti-Russian campaign?

In his last interview for FOKUS, Trushin gave a clear assessment of this climate, stating: "The only objective of the mass media's attempts to portray Russia as an enemy to the Macedonian public is to justify

the increasing U.S. military and political presence in Macedonia, which is becoming ever more visible."

"Inconsiderate Attacks Against Russia"

In a series of interviews for the domestic mass media, opposition leaders Ljubco Georgievski and Stojan Andov publicly promoted the theory that Macedonia is flirting too much with the United States, that it is wrongly attacking Russia and thus losing the necessary balance.

"In their paramount flirtation with the West, they have exaggerated in attacking Russia. Thus the excellent economic links and markets Macedonia used to have are now lost. I fear that this incongruous, unbalanced policy will leave us hanging between East and the West," said Georgievski in his recent interview for DNEVNIK.

In NOVA MAKEDONIJA, Georgievski explained that the "policy VMRO-DPMNE is pushing is that we must be more cautious and refrain from neglecting the East because apparently our strong love for the West is not adequately returned."

Liberal leader Stojan Andov gave an interview to FOKUS in which he did not deny the importance of Macedonian-U.S. relations, but he did say the following:

"I can verify, however, that we cannot say that the strategic interests of Macedonia and the United States are identical... I also believe that it is normal for forces like the United States and Russia to have their own relations and ways of harmonizing them. I think it is childish for one of our ministers to present his 'clear, pro-American' view by attacking Russia out of a simple wish to please the United States. I do not believe we can have a strong influence on the balance of relations between the United States and Russia or that we can affect these relations with our inclination or policy."

New or Old Strategy

There are some major finesses that make up the the two opposition leaders' different approaches to the subject. However, the key word "balance" is in both their statements. Georgievski, a politician with a different background and with less experience than Andov, promoted the idea that Macedonia should create the balance itself. Andov says this is not possible and that the balance is created by the super powers themselves. He says that they establish their mutual relations and that the complexity of these relations does not depend entirely on us. In any case, the dominant theory is that the balance, not the competition, is the essential quality of Russian and U.S. relations toward Macedonia and that this quality must be reciprocal in Macedonia's relations toward the super powers.

Political observers in Skopje view this theory as the promotion of a relatively new strategy. So far there had been talks about an "equidistant" relationship with the neighbors, but the pro-Western code (lately the pro-U.S., and now as before the pro-European) was outside the methodology of the construction of the country's diplomatic position—which has remained indisputable. Andov claims that his plights are actually in favor of returning to Gligorov's policy of 1992-93.

In any event, it seems that the authority and the opposition (Gosev is missing) have essentially different concepts regarding one of the main subjects of our foreign policy: Macedonian-U.S.-Russian relations.

Andov even denies U.S. support to its "wooers." From the context of his statements, it is clear that he has in mind the people who are now creating the country's diplomatic strategy, primarily Frckovski.

"I think the United States has enough experience from Latin America, where many groups made oaths to that county but were later proclaimed drinkers of their own nation's blood. I do not believe it is giving plain support to such people!"

Everything Is in the Money

It remains unclear what has caused such a public promotion of this relatively new concept of the opposition regarding relations toward Russia and the United States (the absence of Petar Gosev, the leader of the Democrats, is obvious, and Trushin says that he [probably Gosev] refused to meet the talkative Russian diplomat).

According to some assessments, it is actually a matter of a reaction to Frckovski's allegedly hostile statements in relation to Russia. (Trushin says Andov had expressed his disbelief at these statements, that he "could not believe that he [Frckovski] could have said anything like that.") According to other assessments, the change in the concept is due to the disappointment after the West (which does not court us) had denied its "love," but also because of the loving offer from the East (which seems to be pursuing us).

Others do not believe that economic interests are not the basis of all this. Ren Ivanovich Vyahirev, director of "Gas Prom" and economically the most powerful man in Russia, was staying in Macedonia this week with the intention of investing 40 percent in a company that is going to manage the gas line (GAMA 800). The Government is prepared to let him invest only 27 percent.

They say that Vyahirev was quite arrogant in the discussions. They also say that the government representa-

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tives responded with cultured manners but with the same measures, probably encouraged by the expectation that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will offer 70 million German marks for the second phase of the gas line provided that the Government procures 51 percent in "GAMA 800."

The gas line is a system that will have long-range effects on the economic situation in Macedonia. He who controls the gas line will have long-range influence on the overall economic trends. Here also comes some speculation that the Liberals control "Makpetrol" [oil distribution company], which is the "mother" of the gas line, and that this is the motive for Andov's statements. Normally, the speculations are rebuffed as "SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] machinations," and it is even claimed that SDSM is doing its best to "swallow" the successful "Makpetrol" by making up some internal cases or weakening it by favoring Skopje Refinery with its new customs policy.

What About SDSM?

Nevertheless, it is true that Russia is basing its penetration in the Balkans on "real" things. While NATO is contemplating whether and how to attach Macedonia to its southern wing, Russia does not face any dilemmas in attaching Macedonia to the southern wing of the gas line (which will head toward Serbia as well). While the West promises a gradual association with the Alliance, Russia promises cheap armament and military and technical cooperation, which was allegedly agreed upon during the semisecret visit of the Russian Army delegation (disclosed by DNEVNIK). It is well known that economic presence means political influence as well. Even Trushin clearly and publicly confirmed this in his interview for DNEVNIK.

Will the view of two out of the three key opposition players strengthen Russia's ambitions for penetration in Macedonia?

In FOKUS, Trushin explained how he understood Andov's and Georgievski's statements:

"As far as I could understand, they are not against developing relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the United States, but they are talking about an optimum balance in these relations, as well as about an alternative Macedonian foreign policy."

The view of the opposition is not the only important aspect of the domination of the idea of an "alternative policy." The reaction of the ruling structure is of great significance. It is of the utmost importance whether the ruling party, SDSM, will start to distrust the diplomatic course, which is headed by the "young and inconsiderate rolling stone," and whether dilemmas

similar to those that were once allegedly raised by some people in the party's upper echelons in relation to the first announcements about Russia's active role in the resolution of the former Yugoslav crisis. There are no such announcements for now.

Furthermore, it is necessary to wait and see the politician's views after the first round of meetings with the new U.S. ambassador, Christopher Hill, who arrived in Skopje yesterday. Some believe that the prolonged change in the U.S. ambassadorial position in Skopje caused a vacuum in the "bestowing" (according to Trushin) of a U.S. political presence in the country.

In any case, there are clear and open conceptual differences between those who are presently heading Macedonian diplomacy and the opposition. These differences are not cosmetic but are related to Macedonia's position in relation to the super powers, therefore discussion about them is unavoidable.

FYROM: 'Equidistance' From U.S., Russia Urged
AU3007173496 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian
27-28 Jul 96 p 7

[Commentary by Slobodan Casule: "Foreigners, Slav-Macedonians, FYROM-ers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are now wandering around without a compass in the midst of our biggest crisis, which seems to have been bottomless since we first came to the Balkans. We lost states in the past as well, but we used to reestablish them. We are now on the road not only to losing our state that was established on the last remaining piece of Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] land, but also to losing our identity forever. Deprived of our identity, we can hardly rise up again!

I do not intend to enter into polemics about FLAKA [FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT], the state newspaper in the Albanian language, and with the editorial that was published on 20 and 21 July. I am perfectly aware of its goals. On another occasion, I would have called for an account from those who give the money I pay in taxes for this state newspaper in Albanian to be published daily and call me a "foreigner, a Slav-Macedonian, a FYROM-er," omitting to sign such a text. I would have asked them whether this is the state's view or a new state definition of the Macedonians as a "...nation that came from beyond the Carpathians, a barbaric nation that wants to rule over an ancient nation (the Albanian), which is a real nation on its ethnic territories...."? I would have asked them if they know how many times we have been invited as "brother Slav-Macedonians from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" to

continue on the road from which we strayed? Because the "Greeks do not recognize your (our) language or nation, and the Bulgarians consider your (our) language as a dialect of their own and you (us) as a part of their nation. The Serbs will not give up the Vardar Valley that leads to Salonika...."

I have been deprived of "briefings" for a long time, and I still am, so I do not know whether something has changed in the last year and a half!

The text in FLAKA is concise. Its strength is far greater than the rough words that express loyalty to one side in the new Albanian-Macedonian order or division. It is a signal or an announcement, whichever you prefer, that the Albanian-Macedonian divisions will follow the same path of the Albanian-Serbian disassociation and separation. Our case is worse, because, in choosing a smaller rather than a greater evil, we have hastily and inconsiderately stepped into the whirlpool of the interests of the superpowers in the Balkans by antagonizing one of them—Russia.

Albanian integration, in the security interests of the United States in the Balkans, and especially the tested and accurately harmonized state and national Albanian strategy have substantially affected the balance of forces in the Balkans, which had already been distorted by the war in Bosnia. Now that the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been defined as a foundation for peace there and as a solution to the conflicting interests, the Albanian-U.S. alliance is imposing a regrouping of other interests in the Balkans, particularly the Russian. Although they are far from being able to define and impose the borders of the spheres of influence, the Russians do not hide that they are linking up with the Serbs and the Bulgarians and skillfully approaching the Greeks as a response to the Albanian-U.S. relationship and to the situation in Bosnia. This is just like the days of the Soviet Union, when Greece needed to exert pressure on the United States and NATO whenever the role of Turkey grew because of the Near East.

In all the mess for establishing a new balance, Macedonia has hastily ran to NATO, wanting to exploit its timely and geographical and strategic importance as an observation point for the war and peace in Bosnia, but also for Serbia and the events that are taking place there.

However, what if this is not the case? What if we fail to harmonize our interests and national strategy with the interests of the United States and NATO? What will happen if we are trapped in the lesser evil and thus remain without an alternative when the interests of the United States and Russia, which is now a rising force with defined spheres of influence, undoubtedly intersect precisely in Macedonia? What are we going to do if

matters continue as they are now, if there is an Albanian-Serbian polarization, and if it grows into a point of crisis between the interests of the United States and Russia in the Balkans? If the intersection of the Albanian and the Serbian interests becomes an intersection of the interests of the Albanian and Serbian interests as integral elements of the strategies and interests of the superpowers?

Do you not have the impression that, right now, we need an "equidistance" in relation to the superpowers as well as in relation to their interests in the Balkans? That, right now, when we need an accurate definition of this position, we are hastily abandoning it? Is that because there is no proper definition of the term "equidistance"?

Do you not have the impression that we may find ourselves, conditionally speaking, on the "wrong" side, or with nowhere to retreat to, at the moment that the military alliance with Albania and Greece becomes too narrow for the fulfillment of our strategic interests, which will be reduced to our bare survival and the defense of our sovereignty and identity?

What will happen when the stability of NATO's southern wing requires an urgent solution to the problems that are burdening it, particularly considering that Albania and we are "partners for peace," and could even be possible full members of this military alliance? These problems center on one point—Macedonia. The problem is the Greek-Macedonian dispute that has lasted for over 70 years with changing intensity, including the Albanian-Macedonian misunderstandings that have been developing recently.

It is no secret that these problems (like all such problems) will be solved according to the importance and priorities that Albania, Greece, and Macedonia have for NATO. Judging by the present deployment of forces, as well as by the list of U.S. interests and NATO priorities, Albania and Greece are in better positions than Macedonia. It is not necessary to remind you of Greece's alliance with the United States and its role in NATO. On the other hand, a lot has been said about Albania on these pages of DNEVNIK. It is worth adding that the U.S. position in Albania is permanent. This country is on the other side of the Strait of Otranto on the Adriatic Sea. Together with the Italian side, it allows control of the Adriatic traffic to the Mediterranean and of gas from the Middle East. So, control of the Strait of Otranto not only impedes Russian penetration into warm waters, but also supervises Austrian-German ambitions in the northern Adriatic. Moreover, it dominates the passage of gas to central Europe, the Ruhr, the Saar, and Ukraine.

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THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Is it not logical, therefore, to give advantage to the Albanian position in any dispute with us? It means that, no matter how rough it may sound, there will be Albanian domination in Macedonia, with a federation as a possible option.

Is it not equally logical that the Greek position will also be given advantage in the dispute with us? This means that Macedonia's identity will be denied, leading to its disappearance as a state of the Slav-Macedonians.

So, in either event, the solution of the disputes in the new southern wing of NATO will suit Albania and Greece equally.

This is why our position is so delicate and additionally burdened by the antagonization of Russia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. Not as options for an alliance, but as a negoti-

ating counterbalance in a possible resolution. Moreover, the absence of an internal strategy for negotiations on the adjustment of our and the Albanian interests puts us in a situation in which we constantly make concessions that are being slowly transformed into a total defeat.

FLAKA, the state newspaper in Albanian, aware of it or not, has sailed on the top of this wave, using strong words to kill, gradually but surely, the possibility for the Albanians and the Macedonians in the Republic of Macedonia to begin to see and realize that the selfish interests of their political elites are pushing them into a direct antagonism, hatred, and God save us, conflict. Their haste in searching for powerful sponsors abroad only makes the two nations serve as weapons on the border of a future global division that is called the Balkans.

Poland: Kwasniewski Calls For More Foreign Investment

LD3007202796 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 30 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ending his visit to the United States, President Aleksander Kwasniewski has appeared before the cameras of CNN. Replying to viewers' questions from around the world, the president encouraged them to invest in Poland.

[Begin recording] [Kwasniewski, in English, fading to Polish translation] The Polish economy is developing very fast. Last year the gross domestic product grew by 7 percent. On 11 July we were accepted in OECD. I think that for every country in the world Poland is an interesting market because of the high economic growth, the population of 40 million, and the well trained and experienced specialists and because of our geographical position between the East and the West. [end recording]

Poland: Daily Views Media Treatment of Kwasniewski

WS3107113396 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 18 Jul 96 p 4

[Article by Marcin Dominik Zdort and Krzysztof Olaszewski: "Kwasniewski From Two Angles—a Success Story or Consciously Concealed Failure?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *The first months of Aleksander Kwasniewski's presidency were, according to the press that was well disposed to him, a success story in both domestic and foreign policy. But the opinion of the dedicated adherents is being explicitly disavowed by the equally staunch adversaries of the president, who maintain that the past six months either witnessed nothing particular or were a round of consciously concealed failures and setbacks. However, voters rarely read both GAZETA WYBORCZA and TRYBUNA; hence they usually remain unaware of the "controversial character" of the incumbent president of the Polish Republic.*

Newspaper political commentaries either unequivocally approve (papers connected with the postcommunist system) or unequivocally negate Kwasniewski's achievements (the anticommunist press).

West I: Remarkable Climate of Friendship

Kwasniewski's associates had prepared the president's first foreign visit very hastily. It was supposed to mark the direction of the new head of state's foreign policy, and also reveal the "European" image of Poland's new president. Success was signalled by TRYBUNA headlines: "Understanding and Satisfaction," "Symbolic Significance," and finally, "Germany Supports Poland's

Drive to the EU and NATO." Leftist newspapers underlined the German and French presidents' notable liking for Kwasniewski. "The atmosphere emphasized the remarkable climate of friendly relations," stated TRYBUNA on 10 January; in the following days the paper explained what else had brought about the success: "Talks with the French president lasted longer than scheduled," and: "The meeting with president Chirac, though delayed, extended from the scheduled 40 minutes to over an hour." "After the meeting, President Chirac walked Kwasniewski all the way down the steps to his car. The entire company of the Republican Guard presented arms!" wrote the leftist daily (exclamation mark in the text). The fact that Chirac walked Kwasniewski to the car, (apart from him, Boris Yeltsin was the only politician attending President Mitterand's funeral to receive similar treatment), was also emphasized by the special POLITYKA correspondent who described German and French support for the new president of the Polish Republic very metaphorically: "Bonn and Paris placed a ladder under the president's window, just like the one in the parliament building which Aleksander Kwasniewski used after finding himself in a perplexing situation" [allusion to Kwasniewski's actual escape down a ladder from the parliament building to avoid reporters].

Reporters of the leftist papers dispelled doubts of whether a Polish president with communist party roots could be treated like his predecessor, the legendary leader of the "Solidarity" independence movement. "Prime Minister Juppe was astounded when he was asked whether the change of the president of the Polish Republic would change the climate of relations with Poland," reported TRYBUNA, reminding readers of Kwasniewski's "worldly" refinement: "Among themselves, journalists also say that the president's previous meetings in Germany were conducive to the continuation of good, normal relations."

Kwasniewski's major success was supposed to be the obtaining of the support of West European states for Poland's NATO membership. TRYBUNA informed that "Germany supports Poland's drive to the EU and NATO." POLITYKA described Kwasniewski's success more prudently: "Poland may wait (for a decision on NATO enlargement) six months." The weekly emphasized this was of no importance: "It will not change anything."

After the January visits to Germany and France, commentaries carried by the leftist papers were very enthusiastic. "Aleksander Kwasniewski has found himself in a good starting position in foreign policy. (...) Everything is going as best as it can," wrote POLITYKA. The commentator of PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY, calling him-

self "counselor plenipotentiary," [as published] claimed very seriously that "Kwasniewski is currently one of the most popular presidents in the world. The first foreign visits, to Germany and France, took place in a wonderful atmosphere. (...) Kwasniewski was also complimented by Kohl. Rumor has it that there is a growing pile of invitations on the Polish president's desk." The views of the leftist reporters are shared by Danuta Waniek, head of the President's Chancellery, (in a PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY column): "The visit (...) was a success. I am not surprised it has been described as such. Now that the visit is over, I have a feeling that top European politicians wanted to make a gesture as soon as possible signifying they have accepted Aleksander Kwasniewski, the new Polish president, to their circle."

West II: Gaudy Nonchalance

The opposition press was already upset by the very manner in which the French and German visits had been announced. Kwasniewski stated that some had paid their first foreign visits to Moscow, others to the Vatican, but he was going to Europe. "It is Europe that our postcommunists often refer to in order to justify their primitive anticlericalism, their ingrained fear of Christian values and of the presence of the Church in public life," wrote the commentator of SLOWO-DZIENNIK KATOLICKI [Catholic daily], calling Kwasniewski's announcement "gaudy nonchalance." Most anticommunist magazines kept silent about Kwasniewski's "success." It was only emphasized that the French visit was of no great significance as it concurred with the arrival of scores of heads of states who attended Francois Mitterand's funeral.

Belarus I: Cleverness of Diplomacy

Much more press controversy was sparked by Kwasniewski's visit to Belarus, soon after the decision was made on political rapprochement between that country and Russia. The leftist press, aware of the threats of propaganda, emphasized that Aleksander Kwasniewski shared the anxiety of the Belarusian independence circles about the Russia-Belarus union, but quickly added (in TRYBUNA) that the Polish president had no reason for worry since his "concern for the future of Belarusian statehood was assuaged by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who showed him the latest, still fresh, draft of the treaty on a union with Russia." According to the papers backing Kwasniewski, the decision to visit Minsk was considered advantageous also by the independence opposition of that country. TRYBUNA reporters noted with satisfaction the cleverness of the Polish diplomats who had arranged the president's meetings with both the authorities and the opposition, and thus "found an excellent way out of a complicated situation." "Opposition in Minsk probably positively assessed the hesi-

tation related to the visit and the fact that the Polish president had arranged for consultations on this matter. There was also general agreement that it was very good the visit had taken place after all," stated TRYBUNA. However, the "hesitation which accompanied the visit" and the "fact that consultations had been arranged for" were more than mere gestures because, as Jerzy Wiatr put it in PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY, "gestures are good in the theater or in the parlor." "Aleksander Kwasniewski has chosen a policy of action, (...) he is building Polish-Belarusian cooperation and strengthening as best he can the Belarusian ambition to cultivate national sovereignty. This is how politics are carried out in the modern world," said the delighted Wiatr in his PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY column.

During Aleksander Kwasniewski's Belarusian meetings, the issue of NATO also was on the agenda. TRYBUNA ensured that the president "has made Belarus moderate its standpoint."

Belarus II: Talked Through His Hat

Newspapers ill-disposed toward Kwasniewski did not expect much of his visit to Belarus. "The current Eastern policy does not give much reason for optimism. Kwasniewski has more in common with President Lukashenka than with the [Belarusian] trade union members who are kept in traditional 48-hour custody," wrote Radek Sikorski in the TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC weekly. The visit was later commented on by Zdzislaw Najder of the same periodical. He admitted that Kwasniewski's visit to Belarus and his meeting with Stanislaw Shushkewich was a good thing. "However, [the president] revealed and discredited himself when he talked through his hat to Lukashenka about the alleged threat the introduction of NATO arms to Poland posed for Belarus." Neither did SLOWO or GAZETA POLSKA commentators have any warm feelings for Kwasniewski after his Minsk visit. "Aleksander Kwasniewski's meeting with Belarusian President Lukashenka should be considered a failure," stated SLOWO openly; "Even if it was supposed to be a working visit, as the official communiques had announced, its measurable results remain insignificant. (...) Some time ago, prominent communists had visited the Bialowieza Forest on the pretense of hunting. In the case of Aleksander Kwasniewski's visit, even that pretense was lacking." GAZETA POLSKA only pointed out to the president that "if, as he claims, the swallowing of Belarus by Moscow 'may be considered part of the European integration process,' the ideal of a similar integration was the gigantic, invincible Soviet Union."

Russia I: Young, Witty, and Straightforward

On the occasion of the Russian visit, Kwasniewski was once again presented as a modern politician with a beautiful young wife. "The Russian media noted Kwasniewski's aptitude for establishing contacts, his easy manners, his good attitude toward his interlocutors." After a meeting with students, the Polish president "left the room warmly applauded by the young people who found the young, witty, and straightforward leader a revelation." "Also highly valued were the good looks of Jolanta Kwasniewska; she was complimented by Yeltsin himself," wrote TRYBUNA. POLITYKA emphasized, just like in the case of the German and French visits, Kwasniewski's good contacts with the leader of the host country. "Between Kwasniewski and Yeltsin there appeared something that could be described as rapport, i.e. a promise of better relations ahead," said a POLITYKA reporter. He pragmatically explained the president's failure to reach full agreement: "Thaws have to be controlled, otherwise there can be a flood." He lauded the new president in the much the same way Lech Walesa used to be praised: "The fiercer the attacks, the better he dealt with them." TRYBUNA admired the flexibility of the Polish head of state: "The Russian commentators noticed that Kwasniewski's position on the issue of NATO is less firm than his predecessor's."

Russia II: Praise for Zyuganov

SLOWO-DZIENNIK KATOLICKI gave a meaningful headline to the account of Kwasniewski's visit to Moscow: "Kremlin Negotiations." GAZETA POLSKA reminded of Kwasniewski's heritage by quoting his words of praise for the Russian communist leader: "'Gennadiy Zyuganov understands the ideals of social democracy well,' said Aleksander Kwasniewski in Moscow having held a private conversation with his old acquaintance." In the same edition, the GAZETA POLSKA chief editor stated: "When Gierk [first secretary of the communist party in the 1970s] went to Moscow, he took Jaroslaw Iwaszkiewicz with him to emphasize the supraparty character of the delegation. At Kwasniewski's side, the role of chaperon and coordinator of the performance was played by Geremek [of the Freedom Union]. The whole reform-oriented group worked hard to prevent Kwasniewski, who speaks good Russian, from revealing that he also thinks in Russian."

USA I: Revamped the Image of Poland

According to TRYBUNA editors, Aleksander Kwasniewski's U.S. visit was a success. The president, they said, returned "tired but satisfied." Yet even this paper did nothing to hide the fact that "Kwasniewski left the USA without being told by his host when Poland

is to join NATO." The paper does, however, end its "Sto Slow" ["One Hundred Words"] commentary on a high note: "Despite everything, Kwasniewski's U.S. visit was very profitable, a fact emphasized by the U.S. media. (...) A new image of Poland and its president has emerged in the United States. Many fears have been dissipated." A few days later, the president once again came out first in TRYBUNA's weekly quotations for "revamping the image of Poland" and "doing so much to strengthen the Polish-Jewish dialogue."

USA II: Worthless Decision

SLOWO was in concord with TRYBUNA in stating that a mere confirmation that Poland will be accepted into NATO without any closer date "is no revelation." However, the DZIENNIK KATOLICKI commentator, as opposed to the TRYBUNA reporter, explained: "The decision to enlarge NATO is worthless without a calendar," he stated. "Kwasniewski has been once again given no answer, just 'kind words.' (...) There was too much verbosity." [passage omitted]

Poland: Cross-Border Anticrime Accord With Lithuania Signed

LD2507135396 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1200 GMT 25 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Poland and Lithuania have signed an agreement in Warsaw on cooperation in combating crime on their joint border. Signing the document were Mieczyslaw Nogaj, the chairman of the Main Customs Office, and Vitalijus Gerzonas, director general of the customs department of the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance.

Mieczyslaw Nogaj said that the agreement constituted the implementation of an agreement concluded in January between the governments of Poland and Lithuania on cooperation and assistance in customs matters. In his view the agreement will help to protect economic and social interests and, in particular, will help to make it possible to exchange information quickly on crimes that have been revealed, or are being planned.

[Warsaw PAP in Polish at 1114 GMT on 25 July in a similar report adds: "Pure alcohol and tobacco products were the main things smuggled from Lithuania into Poland, whereas there was virtually no smuggling from Poland into Lithuania. Gerzonas also said that there would be stricter controls on the Lithuanian side of the border because of the rampant number of car thefts in Poland."]

**Poland: Senator Interviewed on UOP Difficulties,
Role**

96EP0085A Krakow CZAS KRAKOWSKI in Polish
23 Jun 96 p 5

[Interview with Senator Krzysztof Kozlowski, former minister of internal affairs, by Piotr Legutko; place and date not given: "Counterintelligence's Enthusiasm Is Cooling"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Legutko] Do you consider yourself an adviser to the minister of internal affairs?

[Kozlowski] I am a member of the political advisory committee under the minister of internal affairs, but this does not at all mean that I am his adviser. It is an odd situation when the minister contacts his adviser through the mediation of a public prosecutor.

[Legutko] At a meeting with the Parliamentary Caucus of the Labor Union Party dealing with the by now highly publicized instruction from the head of the UOP [Office of State Protection] concerning the monitoring of the situation at workplaces, Minister Siemiatkowski declared that similar instructions had been issued by previous heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Do you confirm this?

[Kozlowski] I am sorry but Minister Siemiatkowski is lying. Had such instructions, such orders, existed, they would not have to be reissued in April 1996. If similar practices took place earlier, then that was against explicit instructions forbidding the use of operational methods. After all, the Security Service included a special department for the surveillance of workplaces, and especially of trade unions. We did not disband it in 1990 only in order to turn counterintelligence loose on workers afterward.

[Legutko] In defining more precisely, as it were, the aforementioned instruction Prime Minister Cimoszewicz stated that failure to execute it would imperil national security.

[Kozlowski] The purpose of counterintelligence is to combat foreign agents, political terrorism, and organized crime of an international nature. There exist several domains in which counterintelligence is worthwhile and deserves the money spent on it. But workplaces are not an enemy of counterintelligence. The attempt to pacify these workplaces, the attempts to resort to political police owing to the ineffectiveness of economic instruments—these are things familiar to us from the past; during the martial-law era the workplaces used to be the main enemy of those in power, and that was why Department V used to operate. And it turned out to be an impossible task. Spying at workplaces is simply not

feasible, quite aside from the revolting nature of such an activity.

Why am I so upset over that instruction? Operational methods mean gross invasion of privacy. When this is done to terrorists, that is understandable. If someone is spying, acting to injure my country, then I have the right to respond in a similar manner. The intelligence service employs operational procedures, and counterintelligence must also employ them. But nowadays God preserve us from emulating the methods of the old Security Service with its preemptive approach to, say, preventing impending strikes at the Sendzimir Steelplant or at the coal mines.

[Legutko] Minister Siemiatkowski claims that using operational techniques was not part of the instruction in question.

[Kozlowski] Counterintelligence is a kind of surveillance police with a network of agents and it monitors correspondence. In some cases this is unavoidable. But I repeat, if counterintelligence is permitted today to take preventive measures in identifying suspects and suspect workplaces, then it might as well shift its attention to CZAS KRAKOWSKI tomorrow. The entire philosophy of the Security Service consisted in controlling everything and everyone. That turned out to be infeasible.

[Legutko] Every police force tends to extend its domination as far as possible. While you were in charge of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, did some mechanisms exist to protect trade-union activities from total surveillance?

[Kozlowski] For that purpose we set up two tiers, as it were, at the ministry. The first tier was the Office for Analyses and Information, which was to keep track of political, social, and economic life, as well as of happenings at the big workplaces. But it was to do so solely on the basis of available materials provided by political parties and trade unions. The office was not allowed to employ operational techniques. Besides, the amount of publicly available information was so huge that the entire problem consisted in selection. For this very reason it is astonishing that the minister of internal affairs and the prime minister argue that they want to know what people are thinking. And that they must use the counterintelligence service for this purpose. To know what people at the Gdansk Shipyard or in Silesia are thinking, it suffices to read the results of opinion polls.

[Legutko] On what occasion is the intrusion of counterintelligence in workplaces warranted?

[Kozlowski] When I used to head the Ministry of Internal Affairs, if a red light began to glow at the afore-

mentioned first tier, at that "department of white intelligence," meaning that somebody wanted to resort to violence and disregard the constitutional system (as, e.g., openly declared by Lepper's peasants), then the departmental head referred the matter to counterintelligence, for operational response. But only in such cases, and that is the whole point.

[Legutko] Once at a news conference you mentioned the danger to the state due not only to its domination by a partisan government but also to internal fragmentation, meaning the utilization of classified state secrets in the bickering among factions of the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance]. Could the leak we are discussing also be an element of that factional struggle?

[Kozlowski] The prosecutor asked me a similar question. It is a fact that for the last few months we have been dealing with an astounding concatenation of events. Successive politicians have been viewing it as quite appropriate to avail themselves of documents that are, after all, state secrets, for the benefit of their own parties or even party factions. The official superior of Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz declared that, as the possessor of a state secret, the prosecutor could do with it as he pleased. Thus Gorzkiewicz decided that he had the right to disclose that secret to Oleksy. Jerzy Urban [editor of NIE] similarly decided that he had the right to disclose secret correspondence with the Vatican in order to torpedo the ratification of the concordat—just in order to score a point against President Aleksander Kwasniewski. As a next step, the same Urban also is blackmailing Minister Siemiatkowski, threatening that unless the agreement signed with the CIA is renounced, he will publish the text of that agreement. All this squabbling is being done within a single party, the SLD. Considering that UOP head Czempinski was dismissed on the charge that he did not stop the leaks from the UOP, this is all the more reason why Kapkowski's nomination replacing Czempinski should not be approved.

You are asking whether the leak about the infiltration of counterintelligence into workplaces is part of these things? No. But still the related material is so incriminating to the heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, both Kapkowski and Siemiatkowski, that I doubt that the sources of this leak are linked to them.

[Legutko] Are resignations from office, such as that of the head of the "white intelligence," due to "pushing out" UOP officials who are not linked to the present governing coalition, or are they due to the hardly bearable pressure under the previous governing alignment?

[Kozlowski] Both. I observed how last February Gromoslaw Czempinski was pushed out of the UOP. He had submitted his resignation to the previous minister

of internal affairs. Once the new prime minister and the new minister of internal affairs assumed office, they remembered Czempinski's letter of resignation and did everything in their power to prevent him from withdrawing it.

[Legutko] Do you agree with the opinion of Milczanowski that we are currently witnessing a "purge" of UOP branch offices?

[Kozlowski] I am in total agreement with Milczanowski. Yes, the point is to pacify the UOP, to make it an obedient tool. "They are to be the confidants of the governing coalition," as I was told by the head of state.

[Legutko] What people are now replacing the discharged UOP officers? Do you know them?

[Kozlowski] Nearly all the key posts are vacant now. Purges of this kind always offer an opportunity to people who would otherwise stay put. As for the criteria for their promotion, there is only one: obedience. Nothing else matters. I realize that this is a very sharp judgment, but unfortunately that is so. The transfer of the UOP to the Office of the Prime Minister will only strengthen this mechanism, and at the same time it will block for a long period of time effective operations of intelligence and counterintelligence for the prosaic reason that every new appointee will take a year to settle down in his new office and acquire a niche in the governing alignment.

[Legutko] Do you think that the Oleksy affair may yet resurface?

[Kozlowski] Much has been done to hinder effectively finding the truth about that affair—that is, if it could ever be found at all. From the beginning, the dossiers circulated among the prosecutors pointed to one thing: a leak from political circles to Russian intelligence. But today no one any longer from the prime minister to the head of the UOP, is asking whether Oleksy was guilty, or if not Oleksy, was it someone else? The question is now in abeyance.

Operational material is characteristically circumstantial evidence that admits multiple interpretations. Hence, the administration of justice the world over is hardly eager to use such material. Thus, I understand the prosecutor's behavior. (A justification that I find ridiculous because it is so odd.) Normally, prosecutors quash 50 percent or more of the cases based on information provided by police informants. Of course, that is another matter, but the pattern is similar. But this does not mean that the case is not politically unambiguous. I believe that contacts such as those entertained by Oleksy should mean an unequivocal verdict of political demise to a politician.

[Legutko] Are there still any documents, such as tapes, or witnesses, on that matter that have not yet been made public?

[Kozlowski] You may have noticed that the suicide rate in general is relatively low. The persons who had transmitted the Oleksy case to the prosecutor's office following the electoral defeat of Lech Walesa and the public resignation of Milczanowski were aware that they were taking a suicidal step. I am referring to the Generals Jasik and Czempinski, and to several others. Had the mentality of these individuals still been of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] brand, the day after the presidential elections, or no later than a day after Milczanowski's departure from the ministry, they would have retracted everything. Yet until the very end, at hearings before successive commissions, they all claimed that there indeed were grounds for serious suspicions. But now that they have been removed from office no new suicides can be seen.

I fear that one consequence of the Oleksy affair will be that those who retain their jobs at the Office for State Protection will acquire the following mindset: Provoking the Russian secret services means personal repercussions and becoming penalized. Thus, the enthusiasm for providing good counterintelligence concerning Poland's eastern neighbor will cool. It is fairly easy to bring about friendly contacts between those UOP personnel who had previously belonged to the Security Service and the U.S., British, or French intelligence services. But as for crossing a certain threshold and dealing with the services to which they used to have close ties, that is another matter. I had thought that this would take a couple of years, but it has taken much less time. But now everyone will again feel reluctant about such involvement.

Romania: Iliescu Places 26 Generals on Reserve Duty*AU3007164096 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 24 Jul 96 p 2*

[Article by Lavinia Gheorghe and Doru Dragomir: "By a Decree Signed by President Ion Iliescu, 26 Generals of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior Have Been Placed on Reserve Duty"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Two Colonels From the Border Guard Troop Have Been Promoted to the Rank of General

By a decree issued by President Ion Iliescu, yesterday, 23 July, at the Cotroceni Palace, two top active-duty officers of the Border Guard Troops were promoted to the rank of general and nine generals of the Ministry of the Interior have been placed on reserve duty.

On the same occasion, eleven generals of the Ministry of National Defense were placed on reserve duty and six colonels were promoted to the rank of brigadier general and placed on reserve duty.

The ceremony started after a delay of over two hours because of the Country's Supreme Defense Council proceedings, which ran well over the scheduled time.

Ion Iliescu invited all members of the Country's Supreme Defense Council to drink a glass of champagne with the new reserve officers.

Here is the list of the officers who were placed on reserve duty in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of Military Personnel: Army Corps General Dinca Ion Constantin, Vice Admiral Iordache Marin Constantin, Brigadier Gen. Berheciu Constantin Vasile, Brig. Gen. Bucatariu Procopie Gheorghe, Brig. Gen. Dumitrescu Nicolae Stefan, Brig. Gen. Florea Gheorghe Marin, Brig. Gen. Kemenici Andras Andrei, Brig. Gen. Sarpe Vasile Paul, Brig. Gen. Vlasianu Vasile Radu, Rear Adm. Eremie Nicolae Nicolae, Brig. Gen. Sandu Gheorghe Mihai, Colonel Cojocaru Stancu Ion, Col. Jurau Moise Gheorghe, Col. Popa Radu Gheorghe, Col. Popescu Petre Dumitru, Col. Preda Constantin Gheo-

rghe, Col. Valcu Irina Niculae, Brig. Gen. Caraulleanu Gheorghe Gheorghe, Brig. Gen. Chelariu Petru Jean, Brig. Gen. Danciu Octavian Victor, Brig. Gen. Gheorghioiu Vasile Vasile, Brig. Gen. Mihai Ioan Gheorghe, Brig. Gen. Pasa Gheorghe Ion, Brig. Gen. Palaceanu Ion Eugen, Brig. Gen. Secu Marin Mihail, Brig. Gen. Stangaceanu Mihai Petru.

The following two colonels of the Border Guard Troops were promoted to the rank of brigadier general: Mocanu Ion Romulus and Moldovan Ioan Nicolae.

Gen. Paul Sarpe, former head of the Army's Research Directorate and Romania's former military-diplomatic representative at NATO, a well-known person before and after December 1989 in the Romanian Army, was also placed on reserve duty.

Romania: Army, Interior Ministry Cadre Law Violations Listed*AU3007170196 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 26 Jul 96 p 1*

[Mediafax report: "In the First Half of This Year, 650 Army and Ministry of the Interior Personnel Have Been Taken to Court"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the first half of the year 1996, military prosecuting magistrates have sent to court 424 cadres of the Ministry of National Defense and 226 cadres of the Ministry of the Interior, reads the balance sheet of the Military Prosecuting Magistracy Sections. According to the report, in this period, the Military Prosecuting Magistracies have resolved 3,545 penal cases and 748 persons have been taken to court. Of all the persons turned over to the judiciary bodies, 271—of whom 259 were accused of theft—have committed infractions against private property. Another 133 persons have been taken to court for infractions against persons, of whom 20 for rape and 12 for murder or attempted murder. In the first half of this year, 70 soldiers have been taken to court for desertion, while in the same period in 1995, 105 soldiers were taken to court for desertion.

Slovenia: Israeli-Built Army Patrol Boat Arrives in Harbor

AU3007190696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 1330 GMT 30 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A patrol boat that the Slovene Army purchased in Israel sailed into Koper harbor this morning. The public presentation of the boat will take place on Thursday [1 August] afternoon. Robert Skerjanc reports:

[Begin recording] The military boat of Israeli manufacture has sailed a rather long negotiating path, it seems. The information that Slovenia was planning to purchase the boat was first heard at a Defense Ministry news conference a couple of years ago. On that occasion, Defense Minister Kacin mentioned that Slovenia was also planning to purchase a vessel for the supervision of its sea. The news conference in question took place only a couple of days after the minister's visit to Israel.

The navy commander also participated at the news conference. He said that the Israelis, at least regarding the sea, have much in common with Slovenia and, on the basis of their experience, constructed a series of military vessels that are very quick and also very stable on rough sea. The reason that we negotiated with the Israelis also lies in the fact that the arms embargo applied to Slovenia at the item and the Israelis were one of the few partners who, at least as concerns arms, maintained an interrupted dialogue with our country.

For the time being, the public does not know yet how much the military patrol boat will cost, however, this information is likely to emerge very soon. The purchase supposedly adhered to the regulations laid down by the Law on Defense Funds.

There will doubtlessly be people, just as was the case when we purchased Israeli communications equipment, who will now claim that the boat is not compatible with NATO standards, that is, that gross irregularities occurred in the course of the purchase. I believe that the problems surrounding the purchase of the police patrol boat taught us all a good lesson and, thus, one does not anticipate financial errors. As for the compatibility, interoperativeness, and other similar fancy words, the opinions will differ. What can we do when we seem to be the experts on just about everything? [end recording]

Slovenia: Army Expected To Purchase Israeli Patrol Boat

AU3007210296 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene
29 Jul 96 p 3

[Report by Tomaz Bukovec: "Ankaran Will Guard the Sea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 29 July—Much ink has already been spilled on the subject of the new Slovene military vessel. Some circles mentioned the purchase of the Israeli gunboats as a possibility, but that turned out to be wrong. Specifically, a freighter loaded with the first Slovene Army military vessel is at the moment already sailing toward our seas. The vessel in question is definitely not a gunboat.

VJESNIK military commentator Fran Visnar was the first to write about the Slovene Army's negotiations with the Israeli industry. Even before his article, we reported on the presentation of different Israeli military vessels and patrol boats in DNEVNIK, but we did not mention any specific models at that time. Since it became independent, Slovenia has maintained successful cooperation with the Israeli military industry. Visnar and some Slovene officers at the time mentioned three Israeli gunboats, Reshef, Mitvatch, and Hetz, and the Defense Ministry was supposedly most interested in the relatively cheap (compared to the other two) version of the Mitvatch gunboat, class SAAR 2, which is 45 meters long, 7 meters wide, has a draft of 2.5 meters, and a 250-metric ton displacement. As a result of differing information surrounding the purchase, the public has believed for some time that our country would purchase precisely that type of vessel. Defense Minister Jelko Kacin has unofficially been announcing the arrival of "a certain ship" since January. According to our information, the ship is coming now and will arrive in Slovene territorial waters within three days. We can expect its official presentation this week or at the beginning of the coming week.

We may ask ourselves why the Slovene Army needs a military vessel for such a small sea, bearing in mind that the police force already has its "modern" P111 patrol boat, which the experts say is bad. Admiral Marjan Pogacnik, former commander of the navy general staff for the South Adriatic and, prior to Yugoslavia's disintegration, commander of the North Adriatic fleet, told NEDELJSKI DNEVNIK that the task of military vessels in peacetime is to supervise the outside borders of the territorial waters, which can be done more effectively with vessels rather than by land observation. Other tasks, such as controlling entry into territorial waters, preventing smuggling, and similar tasks are performed jointly with the vessels of the maritime

police, the harbormaster, and the alert and surveillance service. In case of war, there is definitely enough room for small vessels in the Slovene part of the Adriatic Sea. Their fundamental task would be to defend maritime communications, perform antilanding and antisabotage activities, fight enemy ships, participate in various ally fleets, accompany convoys, protect maritime communications outside our borders, and naturally, to perform surveillance and alert activities. With the help of the military vessel, Slovenia will achieve a firmer border control than it can with the P111 patrol boat, which has turned us into a butt of derision of all seamen.

According to our information, the Slovene Army has purchased the patrol boat of the Super class. This was first manufactured in 1987, and the first test ship was launched in November 1988. Three vessels intended for export are manufactured annually. The Israelis started manufacturing a more modern and faster MKIII in 1993 for the U.S. Navy. We anticipate that Slovenia will purchase Super Dvora II, which is made of aluminum. Its displacement ranges between 44 and 48 metric tons (depending on the engine). It is 21.6 meters long and 5.5 meters wide. It sports two diesel engines with a maximum power of 1,000 kwh, while its draft is only

0.9 meters. The crew consists of four to 10 men, and it can take more than 18 soldiers aboard. This is a very quick patrol boat. It can sail at a speed of 32 to 36 knots (59 to 66 kilometers per hour) and develop a maximum speed of 35 to 40 knots (64 to 74 kilometers per hour). At the speed of 30 knots, it can sail 700 miles (1,296 kilometers) miles without refueling, and it can do the same for 1,200 miles at 17 knots. Its fuel tank can accommodate 10,000 liters of fuel and 600 liters of water. As an illustration, the speed in question is that of very capable speedboats, while aircraft carriers sail at a speed of 38 to 40 knots.

The vessel can be armed with sea-to-sea and sea-to-surface missiles, 20- to 25-mm guns, or 7.62-mm machine guns. According to our information, the new Slovene military patrol boat will be armed, at least initially, with two 20-mm guns at the stern and the stern.

The crew of the new military boat is almost certainly ready, and we are now waiting for the official presentation and symbolic raising of the Slovene navy flag on our first true military vessel. We wish a peaceful voyage to the sailors and their new ship, Ankaran.

Federal

FRY: Deputy PM, Greek Envoy Discuss Bilateral Ties

LD3007180196 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1744 GMT 30 Jul 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 30 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Vice Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic conferred on Tuesday (30 July) with Greek Ambassador in Belgrade Panayiotis Vlasopoulos about bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation in the region.

The Yugoslav Ministry of Information said that the two officials exchanged views on the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement, the peace process and preparations for elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The meeting particularly dealt with promotion of economic cooperation among Balkan states through modernization and establishment of ties between their systems in the field of telecommunications, transport, and energy.

Both sides agreed on the need to enhance Balkan economic and financial cooperation in a bid to achieve a speedier association with Europe.

FRY: Discrimination Against Serbs in Bosnia Election Charged

LD3007214396 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2130 GMT 30 Jul 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 30 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade office of the supervising committee of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has so far included 38,000 refugees in its lists of voters for the September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, office head Zivota De Luca told TANJUG on Tuesday (30 July).

Of these refugees, 23,000 persons do not wish to return to their former places of residence but wish to vote in the municipality where they intend to reside in future, De Luca specified.

The Yugoslav government commission for assisting refugees in the realization of their rights at the Bosnia elections on Tuesday appealed to all those who still have not been registered to apply by Aug. 2.

The commission will ask the OSCE to enable the wounded (about 20,000 of them), the ill and elderly to vote in absentia, because it is the usual practice in all

countries for such voters to cast their ballot wherever they reside, it was concluded on Tuesday.

The commission warned that there was discrimination against Serb refugees in certain countries, which placed them in an unequal position in comparison with Muslim and Croat refugees in the preparations for the elections.

That is why the commission maintains that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as a signatory of the Dayton accords and a party interested in the implementation of all aspects of the civilian part of the accords, should react to such incidents and urge equal treatment which will enable the complete legality of the first elections since the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

After the registration of refugee-voters, the commission will get on to preparations for carrying out the voting in absentia on Aug. 24, and the organization of taking a large number of refugees to cast their votes in Bosnia on Sept. 14, said a statement released by the Yugoslav secretariat of information.

Serbia

Serbia: SDS Said To Divide Voters

AU2607185596 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI
in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jul 96 p 2

[Commentary by Boro Maric: "In Search of Traitors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Based on the division already created by the ruling Serb Democratic Party (SDS), two blocs will take part in the September elections—the patriots and the traitors.

The patriots, according to SDS criteria, is the SDS itself, with the Serbian Radical Party by its side. According to SDS leaders, only these two parties are capable of preserving the Serb Republic. All the other parties, should they win, will destroy the Serb Republic by "drowning it into Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The ultimate point of the division into patriots and traitors, was made today in an SDS statement, published after the withdrawal of Dr. Radovan Kardzic from the position of SDS chairman.

Kardzic's departure, the statement says, is the international community's attempt to create a "puppet government" in the Serb Republic that would "destroy the Serb Republic." This idea would be implemented if the "puppet parties" won the elections in the Serb Republic.

How can the Serb Republic have "traitors" and "puppet parties," when the SDS leadership has resolutely been insisting for the last several years that thanks to them and the party whose vanguard they are, all internal Serb

divisions had been erased, the Chetniks and the Partisans have been reconciled?...

The timetable of events in the Serb Republic indicates the following: the authorities and the ruling party began their quest for the "internal enemy" and "the fifth column" after the first significant defeats of the Serb Republic Army, in the fall of 1994.

And as the position of the Armed Forces of the Serb Republic gradually became more precarious, the number of "internal enemies" and "traitors" grew.

The authorities even lashed out at a number of generals—Ratko Mladic, the late Djordje Djukic, Zdravko Tolimir, Milan Gvero, and Grujo Boric.

In other words, the same commanding officers who, according to the ex-president of the Serb Republic, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, were superior in comparison with officers of the Muslim Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Defense Council, and the Croatian Army.

He also said that the Muslims and Croats will not have such officers in two decades and that the Serb Republic Army was the best army in the world.

There is only one explanation for the departure of Dr. Karadzic and the SDS from their own words. "Internal enemies," "traitors," "puppet political parties..." came about as an expression of the need of the authorities in the Serb Republic to make themselves exempt from all the bad moves they had made during the past years.

For example, did not the Serb Republic authorities pass a regulation which mainly transferred the financing of the army to the municipalities, along the principle of every municipality having to support the units formed on its territory?

Is this decision not a direct expression of a medieval mentality and its corresponding army organization? The municipalities and their leading officials, in this case, can safely be compared with the feudal lords of medieval times.

In addition, the authorities in the Serb Republic had been trying to convince their army and their people for a long time that the war against the Croats was over. And just when the people swallowed that, there ensued a mighty HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and HV [Croatian Army] offensive against the western parts of the Serb Republic, in which the Croatian troops occupied eight Kraina towns and helped the Muslim forces to occupy six Kraina villages.

Following these events, the SDS and its authorities stepped up the search for "internal enemies," and at the same time, they found employment for officials of the

lost municipalities in the Serb Republic Government and its institutions.

At the second SDS assembly, held recently, the leadership of this party pointed out that it had "responsibly carried out their public assignments."

Does this mean that on the threshold of a total defeat of the Serb Republic Army and the downfall of the Serb Republic, the responsibility for signing the peace treaty was pinned on the Yugoslav leadership? Does that act not reflect all the negligence of the SDS and its authorities in the Serb Republic? A negligence that they are attempting to camouflage by pursuing traitors on all four sides of the Serb Republic and the whole world.

Montenegro

Montenegro: First Stage of Privatization Completed

LD2807164596 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1625 GMT 28 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, July 28 (TANJUG)—The new Montenegrin law on privatization provides for shares free of charge to more than 200,000 citizens in the republic.

The first stage of transformation has been successfully completed and 88 percent of capital has been privatized.

The next stage is the introduction of privatization coupons, with employees receiving coupons worth 3,000 ECUs, or 5,500 DM, and pensioners and unemployed persons receiving coupons worth 1,500 ECUs.

The coupons would take up 25-30 percent of the capital, thus bringing Montenegro close to the Czech model of transformation.

The new measures were supported by Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic and Premier Milo Djukanovic, who said the republic had set out on its economic reform and privatization "without a cent of support from the world."

Director of the Montenegrin Agency for Economic Restructuring Milutin Lalic said all firms that had implemented the first stage of transformation had to take the next step—the way to effective privatization.

This is an invitation for foreign capital to join Montenegro's big venture, said Lalic.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Serbian PM Emphasizes 'No Deals' on Kosovo

LD3007165696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1358 GMT 30 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pristina, 30 Jul (TANJUG)—In Kosovo-Metohija, the government of the Republic of Serbia is implementing a policy of peace and it is observing constitutionally guaranteed and legally defined equal rights for all citizens regardless of their national and religious affiliation, in line with the highest European and world standards, Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic said in Pristina today.

Talking to Kosovo business and political leaders, Marjanovic said: "Kosovo-Metohija is an integral and inalienable part of the Republic of Serbia and thereby of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There can be no deals regarding Kosovo-Metohija. This is also what the international community believes."

"The basic policies of the government of the Republic of Serbia are: peace, the rule of law, economic prosperity, and the fight against crime. Within this framework, in Kosovo-Metohija we are implementing the policy of preserving peace and are observing constitutionally guaranteed and legally defined equal rights for all citizens regardless of their national and religious affiliation and in line with the highest European and world standards. We are also implementing a program of economic recovery in this part of the Republic of Serbia," Marjanovic said.

"We will resolve all political and other issues through legal institutions. It is very important that the ethnic Albanian citizens realize that the separatist leadership has brought them to a very difficult situation by practicing a policy of self-imposed isolation."

Marjanovic said that "regional peace, equality for all citizens, and common interests are creating conditions for Albanians to join political and economic life in Kosovo-Metohija and Serbia and to take part in economic, educational, cultural, and other forms of life and work within the framework of legal institutions." [passage omitted]

Federal Finance Minister Tomica Raicevic, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Nedeljko Sipovac, and republican ministers Dusan Vlatkovic, Oskar Fodor, Andrija Milosavljevic, and Jordan Aleksic attended the meeting with the Kosovo leadership.

Vojislav Zivkovic, chairman of the provincial board of the Serbian Socialist Party for Kosovo-Metohija, greeted the prime minister and his aides.

Kosovo: Serbian PM on Kosovo's Economic Development

LD3007192296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1910 GMT 30 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Yugoslavia, July 30 (TANJUG)—Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic said here Tuesday the government's objective was to build a modern and economically developed society based on a market economy, with Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) province having a prominent place in these plans.

In a talk with political officials and businessmen of Kosmet, Marjanovic said special attention would be devoted, in line with the policy of regional development by the year 2005, to the development of Kosmet, which has rich natural resources—fertile soil and an abundance of ores.

Speedy economic development will, along with other measures, help overcome the present political and social problems in Kosmet, Marjanovic said.

The plans for Kosmet's economic development, he said, give priority to the power industry, the restructuring of major systems and projects in agriculture and the infrastructure.

Marjanovic said the Serbian government would continue to insist on firm budgetary discipline, which enables the policy of maintaining sound cash and the growth of real incomes, production and exports, and also on the liberalization of the foreign policy regime.

Pointing out that industrial production in Serbia had increased by 2.2 percent in the first six months this year, Marjanovic said it was especially encouraging that production in Kosmet had increased by even 9.9 percent.

During his visit to Kosmet, the Serbian prime minister visited the metallurgy complex Trepca, which employs about 12,000 workers.

In the 18 months of the implementation of the program for the complex's revitalization, Trepca put out over 55,000 tons of lead and zinc and precious and rare metals, 60,000 tons of chemicals, 6,500 tons of batteries, and 180 tons of other lead, zinc, silver, and gold products, Director General Novak Bjelic said.

He said the value of production was now three times higher than in 1990 when Trepca had employed 22,300 workers. The value of exports is close to 60 million dollars, Bjelic said.

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